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Abstract 
This thesis explores the phenomenon of political mobilization among refugees, with a 
focus on refugees residing in neighbouring countries to an on-going conflict: Sudanese 
refugees in Uganda. Refugee mobilization is a complex issue which involves 
understanding refugees as both cause and consequence of conflict. Refugees can be either 
victims and warriors, or indeed both.  
How does the international refugee regime influence political mobilization among 
refugees? How does the host state affect mobilization? How do factors within the exile 
community shape political mobilization? And how do the international refugee regime, the 
host state, and the exile community interact? From these main research questions, the 
thesis analyses political opportunity structures and the role of collective identity processes 
in political mobilization among refugees. Refugee mobilization is thus approached through 
a critical discussion of concepts from social movements theory.  
Refugee mobilization is analysed in relation to three factors: the international 
refugee regime, the host state and the exile community itself. These are analysed separately 
in three different chapters; attention is also paid to the interaction among these factors and 
its impact on refugee mobilization.  
The study is qualitative and explorative in character. The topic is approached 
through both secondary and primary sources. Primary sources consist of qualitative 
interviews and observation from three months of fieldwork among Sudanese refugees in 
Uganda. Secondary sources are academic literature on refugee issues and political 
mobilization, and reports and literature relevant for the case at hand.  
The literature on refugee mobilization has tended to focus on the role of the 
international refugee regime and the host state, ignoring the impact of social and political 
processes within the exile community itself. This thesis demonstrates the importance of 
examining the social and political processes within the exile community itself, and how 
these interact with the host state and the international refugee regime. Such an approach 
can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. 
This understanding has relevance for refugee protection, for understandings of 
complex conflicts and for a more nuanced regional perspective on armed conflict and its 
resolution.   
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Introduction  
Are refugees victims of conflict – or warriors in it? Refugee flows can be a crucial catalyst 
of conflicts, where ‘refugee-generating violence has produced violence-generating refugee 
flows’ (Lemarchand, 2000:5). Refugees can be both a cause and a consequence of conflict, 
as, in my view, they can be both warriors and victims. Logically these may seem to be two 
mutually exclusive categories, but reality is more complex. Humanitarian organizations 
usually portray refugees as politically neutral victims of war (Malkki 1995), whereas the 
literature on refugee mobilization has focused on ‘refugee warriors’ (Zolberg et al. 1989, 
Adelman 1998). Refugees are thus conceptualized as either victims or warriors, or both – 
victims that have become warriors. This study explores the diversity and complexity 
between victim and warrior, asking how political mobilization among refugees develops 
and is formed differently, depending on the situation. It is in the juncture between the 
notions of refugees as cause and as consequence that a study of political mobilization 
among refugees can contribute to our understanding of complex conflict situations. 
Most of the literature dealing with mobilization among refugees has focused on the 
role of the international refugee regime and on the role of the host state (Zolberg et al. 
1989, Terry 2002, Loescher 2003, Loescher and Milner 2005). The concept of an 
‘international refugee regime’ refers to an international legal framework for refugee rights, 
and also to the policies and practices of international organizations in relation to the 
protection of refugees. The Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 defines refugees as 
victims of persecution, with the role of international humanitarian organizations being to 
protect them. The possibility of participating in political activity and organization is a 
human right, also for refugees. In practice, however, refugees are often expected to remain 
neutral and their right to freedom of association is limited (Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights 1995, Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005).  
The role of the host state can be of importance to refugee mobilization processes. 
For example, many armed groups receive material and diplomatic assistance from host 
states, because of their role as foreign policy instruments (Zolberg et al. 1989). How the 
host state’s policy towards refugees may influence political mobilization among refugees 
will be a central question in this study.  
Even though the role of the international refugee regime and the host state are 
essential factors in understanding political mobilization among refugees, most of the 
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literature has overlooked the situation within the exile community itself. This thesis seeks 
to understand the role of social and political processes within the exile community, and 
how this interacts with the international refugee regime and the host state in shaping 
political mobilization among refugees.  
Deeper knowledge about political mobilization among refugees is important, for 
several reasons. Firstly, understanding mobilization processes contributes to our 
understanding of conflicts and why they persist. Central questions in this regard are 
whether refugees have a role in the prolongation of conflicts, and whether refugees can be 
a key to conflict resolution. 
Secondly, understanding political differences and internal oppression within a 
refugee population challenges the customary practice of international organizations that 
treat them as a homogenous group when providing protection. Better knowledge about 
political mobilization among refugees is needed in order to improve refugee protection. 
For instance, it may be difficult to protect individuals fleeing oppression by the opposition 
group, if members of the opposition live in the same refugee settlement. Hovil and 
Moorehead (2002:14) give a specific example: a Sudanese refugee fleeing from oppression 
in an SPLA-controlled area1 encountered his former torturer in the hospital in a refugee 
camp in Uganda.  
Thirdly, the refugee perspective is relevant for understanding the regional 
dimensions of interstate conflicts. One example is the border area between Uganda and 
Sudan, which has been characterized by instability, insurgencies and refugee flows back 
and forth across the border for decades. Relations between the Government of Uganda 
(GoU) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) have been hostile, and both countries have 
experienced civil wars and insurgencies. Even though the civil wars in Southern Sudan 
between the GoS and the SPLA, and the war in Uganda between the GoU and the LRA2 
are two different conflicts, they are often more interconnected when experienced on the 
ground. This is especially evident through the perspective of refugees, where refugees 
living in these areas have experienced violence and war from all the parties involved, 
especially from SPLM/A, the LRA, GoU and GoS. 
This study is a qualitative, explorative one aimed at gaining insights into refugee 
mobilization processes, while also developing theory on the issue. The research approach 
                                                 
1 SPLM/A = Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army. 
2 LRA = Lord’s Resistance Army 
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can be located at the intersection of what Ragin (1994) calls ‘exploring diversity’ and 
‘advancing new theories’. My primary sources consist of qualitative interviews and 
observation from fieldwork in Uganda, February–April 2004, during which I interviewed 
Sudanese in Uganda who were involved with political mobilization. Both city centres and 
refugee settlements were visited. These primary sources constitute the most important data 
for the analysis, while written secondary sources are supplementary to these. Such 
secondary sources include academic literature on refugee issues and political mobilization, 
relevant reports and literature, as well as news media sources. Various sources and 
methods have been used, as triangulation provides the possibility of confirmation and 
completeness of data (Arksey and Knight 1999).  
The focus of the thesis is on political mobilization among refugees in a neighbouring 
country of on-going conflict. Main research questions are: How does the international 
refugee regime influence political mobilization among refugees? How does the host state 
affect mobilization? How do factors within the exile community shape political 
mobilization? And how do the international refugee regime, the host state, and the exile 
community interact? On the basis of these questions, the thesis analyses political 
opportunity structures and the role of collective identity processes in political mobilization 
among refugees. 
Three factors are central here: the international refugee regime, the host state, and the exile 
community itself. Although these three interact on the empirical level, distinguishing 
among them on the analytical level provides a useful typology in this study. The typology 
will also guide the structure of the analysis, where each of the three factors is discussed in 
separate chapters (3, 4, and 5) and the interactions among these factors are discussed in a 
fourth chapter (chapter 6). 
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1) Theoretical Framing of Refugee Mobilization 
This thesis focuses on understanding political mobilization among refugees in a 
neighbouring country to an on-going conflict. In line with this focus I seek to understand 
the forms that political mobilization can take, through an analysis of the influence of three 
factors: the international refugee regime, the host state and the exile community, as 
presented in the introduction. In terms of theory, particular attention will be paid to the role 
of political institutions and collective identity processes in the analysis of political 
mobilization. This chapter presents contributions from sociological literature that are 
useful in understanding this phenomenon, as well as concepts that will be used in the 
analysis of the empirical findings. Central here are the concept of ‘political opportunity 
structure’ and theories of ‘collective identity’. 
The concept of political opportunity structure enables an analysis of the political 
context in which mobilization takes shape, and also how political institutions and 
authorities influence the mobilization processes. Theories of collective identity facilitate an 
analysis of how social and political processes among a given population influence 
mobilization.  
Most sociological literature within this field has emerged from studies on social 
movements in the Western world, especially social movements within Westphalian nation-
states. This study, however, concerns political mobilization within African states and in a 
situation marked by guerrilla warfare. This is a different context, and one which requires 
sensitivity towards the Western bias of the theory – especially in relation to the assumption 
about a clear-cut division between state and society. The greatest challenge, however, is to 
relate the theory to the actual refugee situation, where the host state constitutes the 
‘political opportunity structure’, in place of a theory about political mobilization within a 
state. 
The conceptual framework presented in this chapter is one against which I want to 
discuss my findings, using theory as a way of viewing the situation from a certain 
perspective, and building on knowledge about political mobilization from other localities. I 
am not seeking a sociological theory that fits exactly with my findings, but I seek abstract 
concepts that can enable a fruitful discussion of my understanding of social reality. In other 
words, I present concepts from sociological literature which I find useful for my analysis; 
they are not assertive explanations of my findings or mathematical equations. Rather they 
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are like binoculars sharpening some figures in the landscape, or a radio tuning more clearly 
into certain frequencies. 
Before going into discussions on Political Opportunity Structure and Collective 
Identity, let us have a look at some issues from the literature on refugee mobilization.  
Refugee Mobilization 
Most literature on refugee mobilization has focused on militarized refugees. This was first 
conceptualized by Zolberg et al. (1986) through the notion of ‘Refugee-Warrior 
Communities’. In Escape from Violence (1989) ‘Refugee Warrior Community’ was 
defined as: 
(..)not merely a passive group of dependent refugees but represent highly conscious refugee 
communities with a political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for a 
political objective, be it to recapture the homeland, change the regime, or secure a separate 
state. (Zolberg et al. 1989:275).  
The concept of ‘Refugee Warrior Community’ emerged out of a study concerned with the 
emergence of an international refugee regime, the ideology of democratic nationalism3 and 
a focus on the armed aspect of the phenomenon, rather than an analysis of mobilization 
processes itself. Refugee warriors are also referred to as being used as foreign policy 
instruments by their external supporters (Zolberg et al. 1986:166; 1989:277). However, it 
has also been argued that if the refugee warriors fight on behalf of the host state, they are 
not true refugee warriors, but actors in an interstate war (Adelman 1998:50). In practice, 
this distinction can be hard to draw. 
Furthermore, Adelman has argued that Refugee Warriors are a phenomenon that 
exists due to the failure of international community to provide alternatives for  refugees 
and due to support from neighbouring countries:  
Refugee warriors are more a product of international political and military relations, as well 
as the misuse of humanitarian aid, than the internal conflicts or the legitimacy crisis which 
produced the refugees in the first place. (Adelman 1998:52)  
Adelman (1998) disagrees with the assumption of Zolberg et al. (1989) about the link 
between refugee warriors and ‘root causes’ (the reason why they fled in the first place), 
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arguing instead that the situation in exile is decisive for whether refugees become refugee 
warriors. He thus makes a distinction between internal conflicts and ‘root causes’ on the 
one hand, and international and regional factors on the other, and then chooses the latter as 
an explanation for refugee warriors. Adelman’s argument needs to be modified, however.4 
Also Zolberg et al. (1989) are concerned about root causes, but primarily in relation to 
refugee protection and the escape from violence.  When specifically addressing the issue of 
refugee warrior communities, they also emphasize the role of the international community 
and regional states.  
In line with Adelman’s attention towards the exile situation, a recent study centres 
on the control that rebel groups seek to have over the refugee population. Stedman and 
Tanner focus on warring groups as manipulators of refugees, emphasizing that rebel 
groups need to control the refugee population in order to claim legitimacy as alternative 
states (Stedman and Tanner 2003:9). This is in line with the argument of democratic 
nationalism. However, the relationship between rebel groups and refugees is not explored 
in the study, but is assumed to be one of manipulation. A distinction is thus made between 
refugees as victims on the one hand, and as warriors on the other. The underlying 
assumption is that refugees are passive victims of the manipulation of militias, host 
governments and geopolitical powers. By reducing refugees to being victims of power 
abuse, rather than actors in a complex political reality, Stedman and Tanner’s study 
overlooks complex political and social processes within the exile community. My point is 
not an argument for portraying all civilians as accomplices to rebels, but rather that, by 
understanding the complexity of mobilization processes, we might find better solutions.  
Most of the literature concerning refugee mobilization has focused on the role of the 
international refugee regime and the host state, with particular attention to the refugee 
camp as an institution that may foster the emergence of refugee warriors. These issues are 
certainly important and valuable to our understanding of the phenomenon, and will be 
further discussed in the analysis. However, this study will also emphasize other factors, 
arguing that the influence of the refugee regime and the host state is not sufficient to 
understand the phenomenon. In this study, I will look into the influence of the exile 
                                                                                                                                                    
3 The argument is that the ideology of democratic nationalism entails that insurgent groups need a civilian 
population that can legitimize the political claims of such groups (Zolberg et al. 1989:277). 
4 This also applies to Stedman and Tanner’s (2003) reading of Zolberg et al., where they argue ‘In their view, 
refugee warriors are symptomatic of a political and economic crisis stemming from globalization, wherein the 
root causes of economic inequality and political repression have radicalized political opponents, prompting them 
to flee to retake their homeland.’ (Stedman and Tanner 2003:6). 
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community in refugee mobilization, exploring the phenomenon of refugee mobilization in 
a broader sense than previous studies on refugee warrior communities have done. 
Political versus Military Mobilization 
One reason for the need of a broader concept is that the Refugee Warrior concept can lead 
to a focus too much concerned with the military aspects of refugee mobilization, 
overshadowing the complex political context. This study aims at exploring the context in 
which refugees mobilize, and at understanding their position within the refugee 
community. The label ‘Refugee Warrior Community’ often fails to take into account other 
types of political organizations, at times even reducing all political activity among refugees 
to the sphere of warfare, weapons and violence. A definition of refugees as warriors might 
legitimize exercising power over the group. For example, the authorities may justify 
keeping refugees in camps on the grounds that it is necessary to control these people. An 
increased focus on refugees as a threat means that refugee issues risk being reduced to a 
military and security question.  
Militarization of refugee communities is a huge problem for humanitarian actors, 
posing a dilemma between how to provide protection and deliver aid, while at the same 
time preserving neutrality. The UNHCR has developed a response to deal with 
militarization of refugee camps, known as the ‘ladder of options’. The first step includes 
preventive measures and cooperation with national law-enforcement authorities; the 
second step involves deployment of civilian or police monitors; and only in the last option 
is there military deployment. (Loescher and Milner 2005:68). The UNHCR’s responses are 
based on police and/or military forces, rather than seeking political solutions. This 
development might in the long run undermine the protection- and human rights focus of 
refugee policy. A solution to the problem of militarized refugee communities will also 
need to include respect for the right of refugees to political association, and their human 
rights in general. 
As this discussion shows, the difference between political and military mobilization 
is not clear. In international law, refugees do not have the right to protection if they are 
involved in military activities. Soldiers are normally not entitled to refugee status, as 
refugee protection means protection of civilians and victims of war. The term ‘refugee 
warrior’ is therefore in this sense an impossibility, a contradiction in terms. But in social 
reality, the distinction between political and military is complex, and mobilization take 
place within a multifaceted social and political context. It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
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to enter into a deeper legal discussion of refugee protection in relation to political and 
military mobilization. Instead, the focus will be on exploring and understanding the 
variation in, as well as the interaction between, political and military mobilization. 
 There are incidents of political mobilization that are not military, and there are 
incidents of military mobilization that are not political. One example of non-political 
military mobilization is forced recruitment, where refugees are kidnapped and forced to 
fight. Another example could be recruits who are mobilized only for employment, in other 
words varying degrees of professional soldiers and mercenaries. On the other hand, this 
might not be so clear-cut either, as people may choose to become soldiers because of a 
situation of unemployment and insecurity, which in turn might be due to political 
circumstances. In other words, the ‘root cause’ of military mobilization may be political 
even if the motivation of the individual soldier is not. I am not arguing that military 
mobilization is actually political, but that if military mobilization has political causes, then 
the response and solution to it should be political, and not only military.  
Political mobilization that also involves military engagement may take various 
forms and evolve differently. Understanding how and why political mobilization becomes 
militarized requires an understanding of the general political context. Another factor is that 
the difference between a movement’s political and armed wings may be blurred in practice. 
The question of the tension between military and political mobilization will not be solved 
in the thesis, but further discussed and explored. I have chosen to use the concepts ‘refugee 
mobilization’ and ‘political mobilization’, rather than ‘refugee warrior’ or ‘military 
mobilization’, in order to incorporate the tension between military and political 
mobilization in the concept.  
Political Opportunity Structures  
A central research question here is how governments and authorities create opportunities 
and constraints for political mobilization. ‘Political opportunity structure’ is a useful 
concept for analysing the political context in which political mobilization takes place. 
Political opportunity structure is employed within the social movement literature 
concerned with the political and institutional context in which collective mobilization takes 
place. The relationship between the state and social movements is a central topic, usually 
studied through the interaction between actors representing the state and actors 
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representing a social movement or some form of opposition to the state. Social movements 
can be understood as political or social collective action constituted independently of the 
state: they can be based on elite or on popular segments of the population, and they may be 
class- or community-based, and organized or unorganized (Mamdani and Wamba-dia-
Wamba 1995:6).  
As a concept, political opportunity structure seeks to grasp the relationship between 
a political regime and its challengers. Understanding the political context in which political 
mobilization takes place and social movements are formed is important for understanding 
how they develop and are shaped. Social movements are influenced by the political context 
in which they operate – ‘permeated by the political culture of the systems in which they 
develop’ (della Porta and Diani 1999:200). Analysing the political context and identifying 
opportunities and constraints for political mobilization will therefore be a central topic in 
this thesis. Important questions in this regard are the authorities’ responses to opposition, 
the degree of openness and inclusion or repression and exclusion towards opposition, and 
how these responses influence political mobilization. 
In understanding political opportunity structures, della Porta and Diani also refer to 
the interaction between actors but emphasize the institution rather than the authorities: 
‘(…) the concept of political opportunity structure has become central to interpretations of 
interaction between institutional and non-institutional actors’ (della Porta and Diani 
1999:195). This thesis will focus on the role of political authorities, to analyse 
opportunities and constraints. These authorities do not necessarily represent formal 
institutions as such. There is a whole body of scholarly literature that discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of African states, where a common argument is that the African 
state is weak whereas the authorities or the regimes are strong (see Bøås and Dokken 
2002). In analysing political opportunity structures for Sudanese refugees in Uganda, I will 
look into the role of institutions and actors directly involved with refugees, but not analyse 
the whole of the Ugandan state as such. I will, however, analyse the role of the political 
authorities in relation to Sudanese refugees and to Sudan, especially the international 
refugee regime and the host state.  
Normally, the concept of political opportunity structure explains how the very same 
structure against which one mobilizes can provide constraints and opportunities for this 
mobilization. In the case of refugees, however, this is very different. Refugees mobilize in 
order to change the situation in their country of origin, but this mobilization takes place 
within another state. The political authorities that shape the constraints and opportunities 
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will therefore not be identical with those of the particular state against which the refugees 
are mobilizing. This study explores the opportunities and constraints for political 
mobilization among refugees by using the concept of political opportunity structure, with 
the main authorities in relation to the refugees being the host state and the international 
refugee regime. This will necessitate some slight modifications, but the core understanding 
of the concept as a way of analysing the influence of the political context on mobilization 
will remain central. 
Much of the literature on social movement and political mobilization operates with 
an underlying assumption about the distinction between the state and civil society. 
Mamdani (1995b) has criticized this element in studies on Africa, pointing out that such a 
distinction cannot be easily made in the African context. He argues that social movements 
and opposition in Africa should instead be understood in a broad perspective, and not 
assumed to be internally consistent and coherent (Mamdani 1995b). Consequently, it is 
important not only to study the relationship between movements and states, but also to take 
into consideration relations between and among different social movements, and relations 
within movements. In this study, the SPLM/A will figure both as a movement in relation to 
authorities like the Government of Uganda (the host state), and supranational institutions 
like the UNHCR (the international refugee regime). However, the SPLM/A also represents 
a political authority – both within the exile community, and in controlling and 
administrating territories in southern Sudan.  
Tarrow (1998) argues that people are mobilized when political opportunities and 
constraints change, and he focuses on cycles of contention5 in understanding political 
mobilization. He defines political opportunities and constraints by drawing on Tilly’s 
(1978) analysis of mobilization, which emphasized insurgent opportunities and threat, and 
facilitation and repression on the part of the authorities. Tarrow, however, places greater 
emphasis on actor influence than on the structures.  
(…) the term ‘political opportunity structure’ should not be understood as an invariant model 
inevitably producing social movements, but as a set of clues for when contentious politics 
will emerge, setting in motion a chain of causation that may ultimately lead to sustained 
interaction with authorities and hence to social movements. (Tarrow 1998:20) 
                                                 
5 ‘Cycles of contention’ describes the dynamics when opportunities for collective action is widening, creating 
opportunities for several different groups to join the protests as well, not only those who started it. The most 
extreme end of a cycle of contention is revolution (Tarrow 1998:24–25). 
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The concept of political opportunity structures focuses on institutional and political 
context, but, as Tarrow points out, also these institutions are affected and influenced by 
actors. This thesis will therefore not only analyse the political structures, but also take into 
consideration the interplay between the political authorities and refugees. 
In addition to emphasizing the actors’ perspective in understanding political 
opportunity structure, Tarrow focuses on the significance of social and political changes. 
Opportunities for collective action emerge when there are changes and openings in the 
political system. These changes may not always be evident, but are rendered visible by the 
opposition and challengers of the authorities, thereby creating opportunities for others to 
mobilize (Tarrow 1998). Peace negotiations may for example represent such an opening. 
Inclusion and Exclusion 
There is a scale of variations of how regimes relate to social movements – from extremely 
open, inclusive and accommodating to closed, repressive and exclusive. Regimes that 
practise a strategy of inclusion will tend to be more heterogeneous and open towards 
opposition, whereas regimes with a strategy of exclusion towards social movements and 
opponents will tend to be more homogeneous and closed (della Porta and Diani 1999). 
These are certainly important factors in the shaping of the political opportunity structure.  
Several studies have indicated that repressive policies are an important factor in 
understanding political mobilization. Tilly (1978), for example, classified political regimes 
on the basis of the degree of repression or facilitation towards opposition.6 The idea is that 
opposition is formed in relation to the responses of the authorities: the more repressive a 
regime’s response to opposition groups, the more radicalized will they become. A study 
comparing German and Italian policy showed that ‘harsher policing techniques tended to 
discourage peaceful mass protest and at the same time encourage the more radical fringes 
of protest.’ (della Porta and Kriesi 1998:211).  
There exist various means of repression, and among the most central is violence, or 
the threat of violence. As this thesis is concerned with a situation affected by war, the 
political context is very much dominated by violence. The relationship between the 
authorities and social movement and opposition could therefore also be understood through 
the distinction between violence and legitimate force. But this distinction is not always 
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clear, and is often subject to political disagreement: ‘(…) the precise boundary of 
legitimate force remains a matter of fierce dispute in all political systems’ (Tilly 2003:27). 
The boundary between political and military mobilization is also blurred. The use of force 
and violence are, in other words, political tools for the authorities. How then does this 
influence political opportunity structure? Governments often employ specialists in 
violence, ‘(…) people who control means of inflicting damage on persons and objects.’ 
(Tilly 2003:35). The role of these violent specialists may be significant in relation to 
political opportunity structures, because the latter exercise the politics of the authorities, 
and their manner may influence and shape political opposition.  Tilly argues for instance 
that ‘(…) democratic civilian control over violent specialists mutes those effects. 
Conversely, collective violence rises to the extent that the specialists escape democratic 
civilian control.’ (Tilly 2003:40). It is important to understand whether violence on the part 
of the regime or a political authority is considered legitimate and under democratic control, 
and how this affects the relationship between the authorities and their opponents.  
From this discussion, an important question emerges concerning the various 
exclusionary or inclusionary practices that the political authorities employ in relation to the 
population they seek to govern. These practices will be analysed by evaluating the 
implications of three factors: settlement, livelihood and security.  
For example, settlement policy might be exclusionary if refugees are more or less 
forced by host states to live in camps. Especially when these camps are separated from the 
local population and located in remote areas, settlement policy can exclude the refugees 
from integration and participation in policy concerning them. Also important are the 
refugees’ livelihood situation, their possibilities to work and provide for food and shelter. 
If they are not allowed to work, this can be an exclusionary practice (Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005).  
Placing refugees in a situation of violence and constant security threat can be 
another exclusionary practice on the part of the authorities. For example, Sudanese 
refugees in Uganda are placed in insecure areas in the north of the country, close to the 
border to Sudan. Some of these areas are affected by the civil war in Uganda, and 
insurgents at times attack refugee camps as well. Security threats may also come from the 
                                                                                                                                                    
6 Skocpol (1979) looked into changes in the repressive capabilities of regimes, and della Porta (1995) studied 
protest policing in Western Europe, which led to a typology based on regimes range of prohibition of behaviours 
and groups, and the dominant logic of intervention (della Porta and Kriesi 1999:210). 
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other side of a border, as when refugee camps are attacked by neighbouring states. 
Examples of this include the Rwandan attack on refugee camps in Zaire, and the ‘hot 
pursuit’ raids of Myanmar government forces across the border to Thailand (Jacobsen 
2002).  
Focusing on the institutional and political context in which political mobilization 
among refugees takes place is important in order to understand the dynamics of how and 
when mobilization develops and is formed. Political and institutional structures and 
processes can both hinder and facilitate political mobilization, and political mobilization 
can influence responses from the authorities, thereby shaping political structures. This 
thesis explores the relationship between the institutional and political structures which 
form the refugees’ situation, and inquires into the relationship between political 
mobilization among refugees and these political institutions.  
The political opportunity structure approach has been criticized for not taking into 
consideration that many social movements have developed within a political context and in 
a climate of cultural innovation at the same time (Melucci 1984, referred to in della Porta 
and Diani 1999: 10). Political opportunity structures can provide a tool for understanding 
how mobilization develops and is formed in relation to the political context, but the 
concept has limitations when it comes to explaining how people form associations 
differently, and how change and innovation are accommodated. This is where theories of 
collective identity can provide useful insights. 
Collective Identity 
This study aims at exploring the role of collective identity in political mobilization 
processes, and thereby scrutinizing the relationship between identity and politics. 
Collective identity processes can influence political struggles, and political struggles can 
be rendered visible through collective identity processes. The analysis of social cleavages 
within the Sudanese exile community shows how collective identity can be used either to 
mobilize people politically, or as resistance against mobilization. 
One important research question therefore relates to how collective identities 
become significant in refugee mobilization. A question following from this concerns 
multiple identities and how certain identities are activated, and not others, in mobilization 
processes. How organizations try to accommodate different and oppositional identities will 
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also be a central topic. But before addressing these questions, we need to define the 
concept of ‘collective identity’.  
Poletta and Jasper (2001) present a broad definition of collective identity: 
(…) an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, 
category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be 
imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although 
it may form part of a personal identity. (Poletta and Jasper 2001:285)  
Through shared knowledge and definitions of some parts of social reality, collective 
identity is an individual’s link to a community. But what is the link between collective 
identity and political mobilization? Simply defining oneself as a part of a community does 
not imply political action, although it might be a useful prerequisite for collective political 
action. Collective identities can often be political in the sense of facilitating claim making, 
as one can claim something on behalf of a collective group. But, and perhaps most 
importantly, collective identities play an important role in political struggles: the 
authorities often define different political identities as either legitimate or illegitimate, 
recognized or unrecognized (Tilly 2003:32). Political identities are collective, public 
struggles that affect power relations, and ‘identity politics’ involves demanding recognition 
and legitimacy. When a collective sets forth a claim of recognition and legitimacy, they are 
also directly or indirectly demanding an answer from the authorities or other groups and 
organizations (Calhoun 1994:21). This is also an arena where political rights enter the 
political life, through the struggles for recognition (Tilly 2003:33).  
In this sense, collective identities play an important role in political mobilization. 
They provide possibilities for identifying and pursuing political claims, and in so doing, 
shape political struggles. Seeing how collective identity influences political mobilization 
among refugees is an important task in this thesis, and the focus will be on how collective 
identities influence political mobilization within the Sudanese exile community.  
Although we need to distinguish between collective and individual identity, we must 
also recall that collective identity is linked to a personal identity. It is important for people 
to be able to identify with the collective identity on the personal level, thereby justifying 
their own decision to participate in collective action (or not). Thus, the collective identity 
of a movement should not only address the social group on the collective level, but also 
‘link the individual sphere with that of collective experience’ (della Porta and Diani 
1999:73). This does not mean that the construction of collective identity should be reduced 
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to an individual psychological phenomenon: it should rather be understood through 
relational and social processes. Collective identities have the potential to reach beyond 
concrete personal relations between people. ‘To identify with a movement also means to 
have feelings of solidarity towards people with whom one is not, in most cases, linked by 
direct personal contacts’ (della Porta and Diani 1999:88). Collective identity can include 
persons well beyond a concrete network of people who interact regularly, and is therefore 
potentially a force for a wider political mobilization. 
Multiple Identities 
Every individual has several identities that can be activated in different contexts and that 
can form the basis of a collective identity. These personal identities may relate to ethnicity, 
class, occupation, religion, sex, regional belonging, age and so forth. Which these become 
important politically will vary with the situation and the place. Moreover, people may 
operate with several different identities at the same time. Calhoun (1994) argues that 
multiple identities are not organized hierarchically within a person, with one identity 
integrating all the others; instead, in his view, they are organized polycentrically. Although 
one person may identify with several collective identities, various factors can promote one 
identity more than another. In a certain context, one identity might be rendered more 
salient for the person than another. Secondly, if several identities coincide in one situation, 
the collective identity will grow stronger. 
In a refugee context, access to resources or land might follow more easily from one 
certain collective identity than another. Also a collective identity based on being victims of 
certain policies might be important in relation to the demand for protection and aid. In 
Malkki’s study (1995), the camp refugees focused on their Hutu identity as victims of 
Tutsi political authority in Burundi, and used this in their formulation of political claims in 
exile. Their Hutu identity was further reinforced by other overlapping identities within the 
community, as farmers and as refugees. In this study we need to explore how and when 
different identities are rendered salient. 
If collective identity can explain political mobilization, it might also explain why 
people do not become involved in situations where they feel that the movement does not 
represent them. ‘If identities play a critical role in mobilizing and sustaining participation, 
they also help explain people’s exodus from a movement’ (Polletta and Jasper 2001:292). 
This depends on how the construction of collective identity develops, and whether they 
feel that the leadership that claims to represent the members actually does so. Exodus or 
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resistance to mobilization may also result from the emergence of alternative, challenging 
groups based on other identities.  
A challenge for movements in their construction of a collective identity is to manage 
differences within the target group: ‘(…) sustaining participants’ commitment over time 
requires ritualized reassertions of collective identity and efforts to manage without 
suppressing, difference.’ (Polletta and Jasper 2001:292). Managing differences and the 
inclusion of different identities in crafting a movement’s common collective identity may 
prove important in relation to the question of a movement’s accountability and internal 
democracy, which again can influence its support and ability to mobilize. In this sense, the 
crafting of a common identity implies preferring one common identity at the expense of 
others, and using this common identity as a basis for the collective. Hence, collective 
identity processes can be understood as a process of forming ‘groupness’. This also 
demonstrates that collective identities are not always internally consistent (Calhoun 1994), 
and that they can always be challenged and reformed. Political struggles within a group or 
movement can become visible through the struggle over collective identities. The outcome 
of the struggle defines who is to be included and who excluded from the collective identity. 
In other words, collective identity processes can involve processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, of playing down some identities while privileging other ones.  
Theories on the role of collective identity in social movements have focused on such 
important questions as how interests emerge, the motivations to act, the strategy choices 
and cultural effects of movements (Poletta and Jasper 2001:284).  But other important 
questions have been accorded too little attention within this literature; one of them is to 
which degree collective identity has been constructed within the given social movement, or 
has already existed previously (ibid: 285). For example, ethnic group divisions existed in 
Sudan before the formation of SPLM/A, but distinctions between the different ethnic 
groups are continuously changing through history, and with SPLM/A divisions have 
shifted over time. To which degree collective identity has been constructed within the 
movement is a question that should be answered empirically and understood in the context 
of particular settings. 
One central study concerning collective identity among refugees is Liisa Malkki’s 
Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in 
Tanzania (1995), a study of Hutu refugees who fled the massacre in 1972 in Burundi. Her 
anthropological fieldwork was carried out in the town of Kigoma and in Mishamo Refugee 
Camp, comparing town refugees with camp refugees. The study reveals the formation of a 
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political collective through the construction of a collective identity in the Mishamo refugee 
camp. This collective identity was based upon a purified ‘Hutu-ness’, and a shared 
categorization of ‘the other’ was important for the creation of this ‘pure’ Hutu-ness. The 
making of ‘us’ and ‘them’ was crucial for the shared knowledge consolidating the 
collective identity. Malkki’s study focuses on the links between identity construction and 
political struggle. This linkage will also be central in this thesis. 
One problem with Malkki’s study, however, is that her way of conceptualizing 
collective identity leaves little space for multiple identities within the individual. She 
writes for example ‘In the Mishamo refugee camp, one’s self-identification was always 
made in reference to the larger collectivity of “a people” in exile’ (Malkki 1995:156). This 
suggests scarcely any difference between the individual and the collectivity, which in turn 
entails conceptualizing refugees in the camp as a static and homogenous collective. 
Furthermore, internal power relations are invisible in Malkki’s study, leaving open the 
question of whether the definition of the collective identity was the elite’s definition, or 
that of the actual community. The present study will try to analyse collective identity as 
dynamic and relational, acknowledging that multiple identities are also relevant.  
Ethnic Mobilization 
Ethnicity is a central social category in Sudan (Tvedt 1994). Ethnicity can also form the 
basis for collective identity and political demands. This study does not conceptualize 
ethnicity as a fixed human trait. Instead, the starting point will be how ethnicity is 
employed politically – specifically, how it is used in political mobilization among refugees. 
Ethnic mobilization emerged as an important theme from my fieldwork, and will therefore 
be a central topic in the analysis.  
It is common to distinguish ethnic mobilization from ethnic solidarity (Olzak, 
1983:357). Ethnic mobilization implies not only that people feel that they have something 
in common that they can identify with, it also implies collective, political action. The 
anthropologist Fredrik Barth (1969) saw ethnic mobilization in terms of boundary 
activation. According to this understanding, boundaries are socially attributed, and 
represent a significant marker between groups. Boundaries sharpen distinctions between 
in-group and out-group. Boundaries and identity are thus related concepts. Furthermore, 
Barth noted situations in which ethnic mobilization is stronger because of other 
overlapping identities, as for example class or religion. The Burundian refugees in 
Tanzania mobilizing as Hutu, their ethnic identity, also focused on their identity as farmers 
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(Malkki, 1993). Being Hutu and being a farmer were overlapping identities that served to 
reinforce the common collective identity.  
But why does ethnic mobilization occur? Competitive models of ethnic mobilization 
maintain that competition over social, economic or political resources can lead to ethnic 
mobilization. In this perspective, ethnicity is defined situationally and socially rather than 
essentialistically, and the individual agent might choose rationally whether to actively 
engage in the group or not (Olzak 1983:361). But in certain contexts, if the ethnic 
boundaries are strong, it might be difficult for an individual not to be identified ethnically, 
even though he or she prefers not to. Still, active participation is chosen, though in a 
political and social context. This study will not specifically address participants’ 
motivation and individual choices, but understanding the social and political context in 
which ethnic mobilization occurs will be important. The distribution of and competition 
over resources might be a relevant topic in this respect. 
Theories of competitive ethnic mobilization have linked modernization processes to 
ethnic mobilization (Olzak 1983:363). In this perspective, ethnic mobilization can be 
understood in light of institutional and political structures, and changes within those. Thus 
there exists a linkage between ethnic mobilization and social change. One example of a 
modernization process is when urban environments bring together formerly isolated 
groups, and ethnicity becomes more salient to social interaction and political behaviour in 
this new setting (Olzak 1983:367). A common feature of a refugee situation is that groups 
that used to live separately find themselves forced to learn to live together in refugee 
camps. This might activate ethnic boundaries. An important question to pose in this study 
is therefore whether – or under which conditions– refugee institutions activate ethnic 
boundaries, as opposed to other forms of collective identity.  
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has outlined the central discussions in the literature on refugee mobilization. 
This literature can provide important contributions towards understanding the role of the 
international refugee regime and the host state, but it lacks an analysis of the role of the 
exile community. In addition, this thesis will explore the tension between military and 
political mobilization. The chapter has also established a theoretical framework for our 
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analyses, through contributions from the sociological literature on social movements, 
focusing on political opportunity structure and collective identity.  
Political opportunity structure draws attention to the political and institutional 
context in which mobilization takes place. The concept of political opportunity structure 
will be used to analyse the role of refugee institutions in influencing political mobilization 
among refugees, with special attention to the relationship between actors representing these 
institutions and the authorities, and the refugees themselves. The focus will be on how 
these relationships shape possibilities or obstacles for political mobilization among 
refugees. Central to understanding the dynamics of opportunities and constraints is the 
question of identifying inclusionary or exclusionary practices.  
Theories of collective identity are highly relevant to the analysis as they direct 
attention to the importance for individuals of identifying with a larger group of people, and 
the implications for political mobilization. Collective identity can provide possibilities for 
groups to gain political influence through collective claim making. Different collective 
identities might therefore reflect political cleavages in society. How collective identity 
influences political mobilization among refugees will be an important question in the 
analysis, as will finding what form of collective identity becomes dominant, and why. For 
these reasons, ethnic mobilization will be discussed in greater detail.  
Finally, a challenging task will be to analyse the interaction between political 
opportunity structure and collective identity, asking whether this will result in a more 
comprehensive understanding of political mobilization. 
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2) Methods; A Qualitative Study 
This chapter explains the choice of qualitative methods in this study and describes the 
distinctive character of qualitative methods. I present the data-collection process with a 
focus on the fieldwork in Uganda, and then comment on the analysis of the data.  
What is qualitative research? The aim of qualitative research is to understand the 
qualities of a phenomenon – as opposed to quantitative research, which aims at measuring 
the amounts of various qualities or traits (Widerberg 2001). A quantitative approach to 
political mobilization among refugees might focus on the size and frequency of the 
phenomenon,7 whereas this study focuses on how refugees mobilize in different settings 
and in relation to different actors. Quantitative and qualitative research thus involve 
different kinds of research questions (Widerberg 2001). I wanted to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of a complex situation, in an open explorative manner. This is why 
qualitative methods were chosen as the most appropriate for this study. 
Validity and reliability are important criteria for quantitative research, in the sense 
that meticulous measures produce replicable data. Due to the nature of qualitative research, 
that approach does not produce data that are replicable in the same sense, but the data can 
be assessed according to an expanded notion of validity related to knowledge statements 
that are trustworthy (Kvale 1997). To strengthen the credibility of the study, the researcher 
should thoroughly account for the methodological choices made during the study. With 
interviews, the relation between the researcher and the interviewees should be scrutinized 
and discussed, as this relation can affect the results (Thagaard 1998). In the following I 
will therefore aim at giving an honest and thorough account of the data collection and 
analysis. 
Data Collection: Literature and Fieldwork 
The most important data in this study were gathered during my fieldwork among Sudanese 
refugees in Uganda. These are the primary sources of this work, whereas my secondary 
sources are scholarly literature in the field, relevant reports from UN and other 
                                                 
7 See for example Lischer 2000.  
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international and national NGOs, and journalistic sources like news articles, commentaries 
and editorials.  I have assessed the credibility of the various sources, and been careful to 
corroborate findings in the primary sources with different secondary sources. The use of 
various sources and literature in order to explore a phenomenon is called triangulation, a 
useful tool that provides the possibility of confirmation and completeness of data (Arksey 
and Knight 1999). The triangulation in this study takes as its point of departure data from 
the fieldwork. These primary sources constitute the basis, with the triangulation confirming 
and completing the analysis of these. Further, I discuss access to the field, the selection of 
interviewees, and the conducting of interviews. The researcher’s role in the setting and 
ethical dilemmas will be discussed as we proceed, while specific ethical dilemmas are 
taken up at the end of the chapter.  
Access to the Field 
Fieldwork involves social interaction in order to get the information one is searching for. 
There can be various social, political and cultural barriers to overcome in order to get 
access to people, their opinions and thoughts. On the other hand, these barriers may in 
themselves contain information about the social setting one wishes to understand. 
Arriving in Uganda, I established contact with the Department of Sociology, Faculty 
of Social Science, at Makerere University in Kampala. A colleague in Norway had 
conducted her studies in Uganda while affiliated to this department through institutional 
cooperation between Makerere and a Norwegian university. I also moved in with two 
Ugandan students one week after my arrival. My affiliation with Makerere enabled me to 
disassociate myself from Western donor organizations and to underline my position as a 
student. Being associated with a refugee aid organization might have affected my 
interviews, as the refugees might have sought to pressure for assistance. This problem did 
emerge, but it was easier for me to shift the conversation away from assistance topics.  
Living and working in an environment with Ugandan students and scholars also 
enabled me to continuously discuss and develop my understanding of the general situation 
in the country – social, cultural and political. I had several meetings and interviews with 
three different Ugandan researchers who were working with refugee-related issues in 
Uganda, and who were familiar with the situation of the Sudanese as well as with Ugandan 
refugee policy. These discussions were important for my understanding of the situation. 
They also provided me with several contact persons within the Sudanese community, and 
towards the end of the fieldwork I discussed some of my main findings with them. These 
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persons, in addition to NGO representatives, were important key informants in my 
fieldwork.   
I encountered both formal and informal barriers in relation to conducting the 
research among Sudanese in Uganda. In order to do field study in Uganda, research 
permission from the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) was 
required. The application consists of a form, an outline of the research and references, and 
there was a fee (200 US dollars). Because of my affiliation with Makerere, and some 
personal contacts, the processing of the application was completed in only a few days, 
while it otherwise often took around two weeks. Once the research permission had been 
granted, I was given a research identity card with photo, and official UNCST letters. The 
letters were addressed to the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) in each of the districts 
where I intended to do research. I therefore went to see the RDC in Kampala who signed, 
copied and filed my letter. I asked him why additional permission from him was needed, 
since I had already registered and received permission from the official authorities. He 
answered that it was for my own protection. He was in charge of the security of the district, 
and now that I had informed and received permission from him, he would ensure that I 
could do my job without difficulties. He also added that many people came to Uganda 
pretending to do research, but in reality wanted to harm the country and threaten its 
security.  
In practice, this whole process was time-consuming and tiring, waiting at offices, 
getting papers and recommendations, finding new offices and so forth. After having 
received permission from UNCST and Kampala’s RDC, I went to Inter Aid, which is the 
UNHCR’s implementing partner in Kampala. I had an appointment with one of the 
officers, whom I had spoken with on the phone. But when I got there, she refused to do the 
interview unless I had permission from the Office of Prime Minister (OPM), Refugee 
Desk. In other words, I still lacked the most important permission, as the OPM is 
responsible for carrying out the Ugandan authorities’ refugee policy. UNHCR and its 
implementing partners have to cooperate with the OPM. I also needed permission from the 
OPM to visit refugee settlements. Doing research among refugees thus required an extra 
layer of permission from the Ugandan authorities compared with other kind of research. 
These bureaucratic barriers, although frustrating and time-consuming, were also in 
themselves illustrative of the host state’s refugee policy. The refugee question is a 
politically sensitive issue. Refugees are defined as a security issue for the host state, and 
they need to be controlled. This is underlined in the title of Uganda’s legal framework 
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relating to refugees: Control of National Aliens Act (CARA). Uganda’s refugee policy will 
be further discussed in Chapter 4. The point here is that information about the political 
context for the refugees was reflected in barriers to access the field. 
The sensitivity of the topic was also a barrier to accessing the field. Early in the 
process I understood that the formulation ‘political mobilization among refugees’ would 
simply create further obstacles, so I decided present my topic as the role of Sudanese 
refugees in relation to the on-going peace process in Sudan. Focusing on the peace process 
and challenges for post-conflict Sudan enabled a discussion of political debate and activity 
among Sudanese within a framework that was seen as positive and acceptable.  I chose not 
to disclose the purpose of my research directly, although I was not trying to deceive 
anyone. This choice was made on the basis of my perceptions of the situation, and out of 
concern for those I was to interview. The topic as such was not directly changed, as 
mobilization was discussed, but the substance was shifted towards the context in which 
mobilization takes place, rather than, for example, the motivation behind refugee 
mobilization. This is reflected in the analysis, which focuses on the role of the political 
context (political opportunity structures) and collective identity, rather than personal 
motivation. 
Selecting Interviewees 
I had three different contact points for starting the recruitment of interviewees. Through 
colleagues from my refugee studies in Egypt, I contacted two researchers who were 
important key informants, and who also introduced me to Sudanese refugees. A second 
contact point was a refugee NGO working with refugees in urban and settlement areas, 
who introduced me to several Sudanese refugees as well as refugees of other nationalities. 
The third contact point was through a former employee of Norwegian People’s Aid who 
introduced me to the SPLM/A chapter in Uganda. All these initial, but separate, contact 
persons again led to recruitment of new interviewees. This technique of using one 
informant to recruit the next one is called ‘snowball’ or ‘chain referral’ sampling, and 
builds upon pre-existing relations of trust (Lofland and Lofland 1995:38). 
By pursuing three different ‘snowballs’ I tried to counter some common weaknesses 
of this approach. An advantage of having three different contact points for recruiting 
interviewees was that they did not know of each other, so the first contact person could not 
trace all my contacts. Another advantage was that the selection of interviewees became 
more diverse, which also strengthened the explorative character of the study.  
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I conducted interviews with eighteen primary respondents. Ten of them lived in 
Kampala, and the remaining eight in Adjumani town or district. I conducted interviews 
with seven key informants: four in Kampala and three in Adjumani. In addition there were 
group discussions – four in Adjumani and two in Kampala.  
The primary respondents were all refugees who in one way or another were involved 
in organizing Sudanese in Uganda. The nature of such organizations varied in size and 
form, from social organizations working with micro-credit projects to political 
organizations like the SPLM/A. There was also considerable variation in age, with the 
youngest person 15 and the oldest 66 years old. It proved difficult to recruit female 
interviewees, and in the end, only four of the eighteen primary respondents were women.  
In two instances I unfortunately had to cancel interview appointments due to logistical 
problems and illness – and both of these instances were appointments with women whom I 
did not get the chance to meet again, due to time limitations. It was more difficult to recruit 
women, as they appeared to be more busy as well as more hesitant than the men. Had I not 
kept asking to interview women, I would not have had any women among the 
interviewees. However, women did participate in the group discussions, and I spent one 
day at a meeting with a women’s group. Still, most of the data used in the analysis are 
biased towards the situation of men, and so I decided not to use gender differences as a 
central topic in the analysis. This is not to say that gender is not relevant in relation to 
mobilization – only that this study does not aim to analyse it.  
Recruiting self-settled refugees as interviewees was very different from the situation 
in refugee camps. Sudanese may be more ‘invisible’ in Kampala as they can more easily 
blend in among Ugandans, at least if they speak English, and/or one of the northern 
languages, or if they have learnt a local Ugandan language. The result was that I found I 
needed introductions and appointments for interviews with Sudanese in Kampala. In 
Adjumani I simply went to settlements for Sudanese refugees, where I could start 
interviewing directly because Sudanese were gathered physically in one place. Thus, the 
recruiting process proved far more time-consuming among self-settled refugees than in 
settlements. On the other hand I could interview self-settled refugees several times and 
more confidentially, in the sense that the other people in the community did not need to 
know which persons were being interviewed. I spent more time in Kampala, and two of the 
interviewees in Adjumani were self-settled. Additionally, many of the self-settled 
interviewees had previously been living in camps. Thus I gained good insight into both the 
situation of self-settled and camp refugees. The different forms of access to self-settled and 
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camp refugees experienced in my fieldwork were not only a practical issue, but also reflect 
the differences between the two types of refugees. This distinction is also of importance in 
the further analysis.  
Conducting Interviews 
The qualitative interview is a method to bring forth people’s reflections, descriptions and 
understandings of their lives and situation (Widerberg 2001:58). It was important for me to 
create a comfortable and informal atmosphere, which could encourage more detailed 
answers from the interviewees. I used an interview guide (see appendix I), but the order of 
the questions was not important and I was free to follow up on the answers given. I was 
also not obliged to go through all the topics. I also had a ‘Fact Sheet’ (appendix I) listing 
specific points where I wished information – matters like family, occupation, education, 
languages, place of birth, other places of refuge, and so forth.  The interview guide proved 
to be too broad, especially when the answers were elaborated. And yet, it was the more 
detailed answers, where I was able to follow up and ask for examples and concrete 
experience, which proved most fruitful. I therefore focused more on the conversation and 
answers than on covering all the prepared topics. Thus the interviews functioned as a way 
of exploring the respondents’ understandings, experiences and perceptions of their 
situation in Uganda. 
Depth and time varied from interview to interview. Most primary respondents were 
interviewed for about an hour, and four of them were interviewed more than once. Many of 
the interviews in Kampala were conducted in a quiet corner in the garden at Makerere 
campus or in one of the cafeterias. These were discreet, neutral, and public meeting places, 
and it was easier to create trust in such an atmosphere. When I visited people or met 
someone at a meeting or seminar I would as often as possible try to arrange for a interview 
separately and at Makerere. In Adjumani I conducted most of the interviews in the camps. 
There I would ask to be able to speak with people separately, which was possible most of 
the time. I also conducted a few interviews on the premises of an NGO, and two interviews 
in the dining hall of the guesthouse where I was staying. The NGO affiliation in Adjumani 
proved disturbing in some of the group discussions, as the answers I got were often 
directed to the NGO activity and its funding. I therefore asked the representative to wait 
outside, or to leave the camp and come pick me up later. 
The interviews were conducted in English, as the primary respondents were already 
defined as a resourceful group, in being involved in organizations. They all had at least 
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attended primary school in Uganda, and the instruction language in Uganda is English. 
Some group discussions were conducted in local languages, where one of my contacts 
would translate.   
An important principle guiding my approach to interviewing and thesis writing was 
confidentiality, which implies that information revealing the identity of the interviewee is 
not made public (Thagaard 1998). I started the interviews by assuring my respondents that 
confidentiality would be respected. Confidentiality is important for the protection of the 
people being studied. In addition it is helpful in focusing the research on social, 
generalizable patterns rather than on personal details about the persons involved in the 
research (Lofland and Lofland 1995:43–44). I also ensured confidentiality in how I stored 
the interviews; I never kept the names together with the interviews, and the interviews 
were entered and saved in my computer, which was locked with a secret password and left 
in my lodgings. The names of interviewees were kept separately. After some while, I 
discovered another challenge with regard to confidentiality: some of the interviewees told 
their friends about the interviews. I therefore underlined the issue of confidentiality in the 
interviews and explained what I meant by it. For example I would explain that even though 
I met someone I knew that this person knew, I would not tell that I had conducted an 
interview, nor what was said during the interview.  All the same, it was obvious that I 
could not control every aspect of the confidentiality issue. Luckily, most interviewees did 
not know each other, but some of them were acquainted, and a few saw each other 
regularly. In addition I have also anonymized persons and quotes in the text.  
Before starting the interviews, I asked each respondent for his or her consent to take 
part in the study. I was also careful to point out that if I asked questions that they felt were 
unpleasant, too private or too sensitive, they should not feel obliged to answer. In fact, this 
happened in only two instances. In the one, the interviewee felt uncomfortable because 
there were many people at the cafeteria where we met, although nobody was sitting very 
close to us. Sensing his worries, I simply dropped the topic. Thus, informed consent is not 
an issue only in introducing the interview, but something to be kept in mind the whole 
time. 
I chose not to tape the interviews as I perceived some of the topics to be politically 
sensitive. I was therefore careful to take as many notes as possible during the interviews, 
and always planned to write up the interviews immediately afterwards. I would either go 
straight home, or stay at Makerere and do the write-up in the student computer room, 
where I had access because of my affiliation with the Sociology Department. The 
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interviews were therefore quite accurate in content, although the exact phrasing and some 
parts have been omitted. I believe that the essential parts of the interviews have remained 
intact. Moreover, this study does not focus on discourse analysis, where the exact phrasing 
might be more important. 
To sum up: confidentiality, informed consent and creation of a trusting environment 
were central issues in conducting interviews and in obtaining detailed and fruitful answers. 
Interviewing as a method proved conducive for generating knowledge about the refugees’ 
perceptions, experiences and understandings of the situation. 
Observation and Informal Conversations 
Observations and informal conversations were also part of my fieldwork. I visited 
neighbourhoods, participated in meetings and seminars, and attended church services. 
Through these different settings I observed and had informal conversations with a range of 
people. These settings were important for recruiting interviewees, but they were also 
valuable in their own right, helping to shape my general understanding of the situation. I 
could discuss the peace process or conditions for Sudanese in Uganda, or the situation in 
Uganda, with different people. I made small notes on these encounters and situations. 
These observations and notes were more important for my general understanding, and gave 
me ideas which I could follow up in later in the interviews. Moreover, I could cross-check 
hunches and questions emerging from the interviews. Such observation therefore was 
important for the triangulation. 
Ethical dilemmas during fieldwork 
One central dilemma during the fieldwork was the issue of whether to offer money or some 
kind of compensation to the interviewees. I did not want to pay anyone for being 
interviewed, as I did not want motivation to be based on money. I therefore underlined my 
position as a student, and that I had no access to funds. However, in most instances I would 
buy drinks and something to eat, and I sometimes compensated interviewees for their 
transport costs, as I did not want them to have extra expenses in relation to the interview.    
Still, I felt obliged to give something in return. I always ended the interview by 
asking whether they had any questions for me. And most people had. They would ask 
about news from the peace negotiations, or about my country. If they asked about funding, 
I said I could help to identify relevant NGOs or scholarship institutions. Thus, what I could 
give back was knowledge and time, not money. My insistence on the student role, and on 
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not giving financial assistance, might have helped to alter perceptions of me as a ‘foreign 
aid worker’. I believe this was true at least for most of the interviews, though in the group 
discussions and more random encounters, topics of assistance came up much more 
frequently. 
Data and Analysis 
Interpretation of qualitative data develops during the whole process. It begins during the 
preparations and literature review, continues during the fieldwork and expands during the 
writing up, and might therefore change along the way (Thagaard 1998). In this study I used 
both primary sources and secondary sources in the analysis. Primary sources, interviews 
and observations from the fieldwork are sometimes presented in the analysis as a retelling 
of the interviewees’ accounts, and sometimes as direct quotes. The quotes are based on the 
notes I took during interviews and directly afterwards; they are not as precise as if they had 
been recorded, but the content is still accurate. The primary sources provided the point of 
departure for the interpretation and analysis. I sat down and read through the material 
several times, seeking to identify ‘analytical threads’ (Widerberg 2001:120), by which I 
mean all the topics I found interesting in the material. Then I started grouping them 
together, trying to see how the various topics related to each other. The researcher may 
choose among a range of forms of analysis, based on different focuses such as topic, 
persons/portrait, patterns, discourses and more. I chose to focus on topics and social 
patterns by interpreting and comparing statements made by different persons, in order to 
understand a topic.  
Analysis can be either close to the data or based on theory, but a combination of 
both is common in qualitative research (Widerberg 2001). Even though I used the primary 
data as the point of departure for my analysis, theoretical perspectives also influenced my 
interpretations. Having identified central topics in the primary sources, I went to social 
movement theory for theoretical concepts that could open up the discussions of the 
interpretations. Literature discussing political mobilization among refugees was also 
important for the interpretation. The analysis was therefore a process that entailed 
alternating between theory and empirical data. As explained in the introduction, this study 
aims at exploring the phenomenon of political mobilization among Sudanese refugees in 
Uganda, but also at contributing to existing theory and literature in the field. The goal of 
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this research can thus be located at the intersection of what Ragin (1994:41–47) calls 
‘exploring diversity’ and ‘advancing new theories’. Exploring diversity implies a focus on 
variety, while advancing new theories means that ideas are elaborated in a new way, 
usually through induction, as through case studies.  
Confidentiality is an important guideline also in writing up the research, as indicated 
above. Therefore I use pseudonyms when referring to the interviewees in the text. I also do 
not reveal which quotes belong to the same person, as they are referred to by different 
names. Official representatives are not anonymized to the same degree, however. These 
interviewees are not named, but the institutions they represent are. They speak as official 
representatives of responsible bodies such as the Ugandan government or the UNHCR, 
which puts them in a different category from the other interviewees. 
A challenge throughout the analysis has been to open up categories, to explore the 
phenomenon without reifying categories uncritically. Literature within the field of refugee 
studies is, to a greater extent than other sub-fields within social sciences, marked by the 
political engagement of the researchers (Lammers 2005:2). Refugee studies therefore often 
seek to promote the fulfilment of refugee rights. This is one of the strengths of refugee 
studies, but it might also conflict with the critical notion of politics of knowledge 
(Lammers 2005:2). To focus on refugee rights might lead to a fixed definition of refugees 
as one group, with common interests and as victims. A problem in focusing on refugees as 
victims is to incorporate the idea that refugees can be not only passive victims but also 
active agents – even as perpetrators– at the same time. Throughout the analysis, a 
challenge for me has been to move beyond this definition, while at the same time drawing 
on the literature. One measure I took was the decision to talk about ‘Sudanese’ rather than 
‘refugees’ in the chapter on the exile community. Thereby I tried to analyse ‘refugee’ as a 
legal and political label in relation to the international refugee regime and the host state – 
not as something all the interviewees essentially are all the time, but rather as an identity 
that becomes salient in certain situations. Moving beyond the victimization of refugees has 
also been a challenge, especially since I heard so many stories of violence, abuse and 
hardship that made a deep impression. Even though many of the interviewees are indeed 
victims, it was important to retain an analytical focus on the mobilization process, and not 
to use the analysis to victimize the refugees – without, however, completing discarding the 
notion that refugees are also victims.   
 31 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has been guided by a quest for honesty and clarification regarding the many 
choices made throughout the research process, and how it has affected the outcome. I hope 
that it can contribute to strengthening the credibility of this study. 
A qualitative approach was considered appropriate for this purpose, as I wanted to 
explore the phenomenon of political mobilization among refugees, with a focus on the role 
of the exile community itself. My analysis was characterized by alternating between theory 
and empirical data, although the primary data constituted the starting point. This has 
allowed the study not only to lead to conclusions with regard to the specific case, but also 
to contribute to existing theory within the field. 
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3) The International Refugee Regime 
The international refugee regime includes the international legal frameworks for refugee 
protection and international humanitarian refugee management and policy. This chapter 
explores how the international refugee regime influences political mobilization among 
refugees. The first section discusses the international legal framework concerning refugees, 
while the second section focuses on refugee management and policy, with the emphasis on 
the latter. 
The international legal framework defines refugees as victims of persecution, 
entitled to protection by the host state and by the international community. Here the 
underlying assumption is that the refugee has crossed an international border. Aside from 
being a framework which makes possible international protection and assistance, it 
contains a definition that classifies refugees as a group apart from the citizens of the 
country of refuge. The first section of this chapter discusses how this can influence refugee 
mobilization. 
The intention of humanitarian aid is to provide help and support to victims of war. 
Although a key principle is neutrality and impartiality, humanitarian aid may in practice 
help to prolong a conflict (Lischer 2003, Terry 2002, Stedman and Tanner 2003, Anderson 
1999). Humanitarian aid in refugee crises can exacerbate conflict (especially through 
providing food to combatants, sustaining and protecting their supporters); it can be a 
supply to the war economy, and it can give legitimacy to militants (Lischer 2003:82). 
Thus, the international refugee regime can influence refugee mobilization through refugee 
management and policies. The second section of this chapter focuses on refugee 
management and policy, through an analysis of four aspects: welfare distribution, 
settlement, the policy of ‘durable solutions’, and humanitarianism. 
This chapter discusses how the international refugee regime influences refugee 
mobilization through the case of Sudanese refugees in Uganda, and through a discussion of 
findings from studies of other areas. It is appropriate to begin with a brief introduction to 
the setting and background for Sudanese refugees in Uganda. 
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Sudanese Refugees in Uganda 
In 2004, when my fieldwork was carried out, there were 214,700 Sudanese refugees in 
Uganda, according to the UNHCR (2004:231). Sudanese thereby comprise the largest 
group of refugees in Uganda, which also hosts refugees from Rwanda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Burundi and other countries. Many Sudanese refugees 
have been in Uganda since the late 1980s or early 1990s (Kaiser 2005:355).  The main 
refugee influxes were set off by the fighting that spread in Sudan after the second civil war 
started in 1983, where the southern-based guerrilla movement SPLM/A was formed in 
opposition to the Khartoum government. With the split in the SPLM/A in the early 1990s, 
factional fighting in South Sudan also led to major refugee flows to neighbouring 
countries.   
Northern Uganda, where many Sudanese refugees live in settlements, has been an 
insecure area, where various rebel groups have operated in recent decades. Rebel groups in 
both Uganda and Sudan have been active on both sides of the border, making this an 
unstable area. Both labour and forced migration across the border have also been fairly 
common since the border was drawn up in the early 20th century (Merkx 2000). This 
international border, originally agreed upon between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and 
Uganda as a British protectorate, divides what was a homogeneous area into two, cutting 
through economic, cultural, ethnic and family relations. Ethnic groups such as Acholi, 
Maadi, and Kakwa live on both side of the border. This has had implications for migration, 
as some refugees have been able to self-settle among their kin on the other side (Merkx 
2000). Thus, cross-border relations have been important for some Ugandan refugees in 
South Sudan in the late 1970s and 1980s8 and for Sudanese refugees in Uganda now.  
Northern Uganda has been marked by conflict since President Museveni seized 
power in 1986. The rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has terrorized, 
kidnapped and murdered civilians, and the conflict has resulted in 1.8 million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).9 In Southern Sudan, IDPs also receive humanitarian assistance 
through the major Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). Thus, humanitarian aid to Sudanese 
refugees in Uganda is only one of many humanitarian operations in the area.  
                                                 
8 See Harrell-Bond (1986) for a detailed account of refugee assistance to Ugandan refugees in South Sudan. 
9 The LRA and the conflict in northern Uganda will be further discussed in Chapter 4 . 
 35 
The LRA has been disturbing Sudanese refugees in Uganda, with the massacres in 
the Achol-Pii refugee camp among the most infamous incidents.10 During the time of my 
fieldwork, this particularly affected refugees in some parts of Adjumani district. LRA 
activity there had led to displacement among refugees, resulting in overcrowded schools 
and re-settlement in safer parts of Adjumani (UNHCR 2004). Adjumani is one of the 
districts that hosts the largest numbers of Sudanese refugees (see map, appendix III). 
Furthermore, the Ugandan government forces (UPDF) have been allowed to pursue the 
LRA into Southern Sudan, leading to further displacement in the region. The result has 
been internal displacement in Southern Sudan, and new arrivals of refugees from Sudan to 
Uganda (UNHCR 2004).  
Both Uganda and Sudan, and especially the border area between the two, are 
unstable areas that have endured conflicts and unrest for decades. This is also a poor area, 
where infrastructure, farming and economic activities have suffered from war and civil 
unrest.  Thus, the Sudanese refugees in Uganda live in an environment dominated by 
conflict and poverty, and where the international refugee regime is a central factor in their 
lives. The starting point for the international refugee regime is when a person in need of 
protection crosses an international border. This person can apply for a ‘refugee’ status, 
which in turn entitles him or her to international protection and assistance. 
Refugee Rights 
Refugee’s international rights might constitute a resource and an opportunity structure for 
mobilization, as the legal framework involves international protection and assistance. The 
institutional and legal definition of a ‘refugee’ came in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, with the establishment of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The definition in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is 
the following: 
                                                 
10 Achol-Pii was a settlement for Sudanese refugees in Pader district, in the LRA heartland. The settlement was 
attacked several times by the LRA, most recently on 5th August 2002, when 55 people were killed. The UNHCR 
thereafter moved the refugees to Masindi district (Kaiser 2005). 
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[T]he term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who [,]…owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Art. 1(2)) (Brownlie and Goodwin-
Gill 2002; Lawyers Committee 1995) 
‘Refugee’ is thus a legal term which applies to individuals outside their country of 
nationality because of (well-founded) fear of persecution, who are seeking protection and 
safety.  The 1951 Convention is based ideologically on the protection of human rights, and 
reference is made to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the Preamble to the 
Convention. The protection of refugees therefore forms an important part of the general 
protection of human rights (Vevstad 1998:44).  
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established by the UN 
General Assembly in 1950, mandated to work to enhance the protection and rights of 
refugees. The most important legal framework for the work of the UNHCR and 
international refugee protection is enshrined in the 1951 United Nations Convention and its 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter ‘the 1951 Convention’).   
States signatory to the 1951 Convention are legally bound to follow the 
requirements of the Convention. This means that host states have the legal obligation to 
protect refugees – most importantly, to provide protection to the refugee until the 
circumstances causing his or her well-founded fear of persecution cease to exist. A crucial 
element of this duty is that states may not return a refugee to a place where his life or 
security is threatened. This is often referred to as the principle of non-refoulement 
(Vevstad 1998:137).   
Although Uganda as a host state and as a signatory to the 1951 Convention has the 
legal obligation to protect refugees, the UNHCR has also assumed some of these 
responsibilities in Uganda. For example, the UNHCR has the primary role in refugee status 
determination (RSD) procedures, thus both exercising refugee protection as well as being 
the body set to monitor it. Some scholars have criticized this position, asserting that the 
result is that the UNHCR is unable to promote refugee rights, and is even responsible for 
the violation of these rights (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:17). 
The UNHCR is expected to offer impartial protection to refugees irrespective of 
race, gender, nationality, political opinion or religion. Paragraph 2 of the UNHCR statutes 
underlines that the work of the High Commissioner ‘shall be of an entirely non-political 
character; it shall be humanitarian and social (...)’ (UNHCR 1996). Although its  work is 
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intended to be humanitarian and non-political, the UNHCR usually operates in a highly 
political environment, where national and international interests diverge and where 
international responsibility for refugee protection can clash with national sovereignty 
(Goodwin-Gill 1999:222). The ideals of impartiality and neutrality often conflict with 
political realities. This is a dilemma that applies to humanitarian aid in general, not only 
refugee aid. 
In 1969 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a convention as a means 
of addressing the specific refugee situation in Africa. This OAU Convention of 1969 is 
complementary to the 1951 UN Convention, but extends the definition of refugees to 
include victims of generalized violence, not only directly targeted individuals (Vevstad 
1998:103). The OAU Convention also sets limitations on the political rights of refugees, 
through its paragraph on ‘subversive activities’ (Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2002, 
Lawyers Committee 1995). A distinction is made between the refugee who ‘seeks a 
peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of fomenting 
subversion from the outside’ (Preamble, 4).11 The expression ‘subversive activities’ is not 
clearly defined, but has been interpreted broadly by many African states and used as a way 
to control refugees seeking to form political associations. These restrictions on political 
rights of the refugee do not tally with the freedom of expression and association guaranteed 
in articles 19 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
In reality, the degree to which refugee political activity is restricted or not will depend on 
the host government’s own preferences and interests (Lawyers Committee 1995). Host 
states vary in their practice regarding the degree to which they allow political activities 
among refugees on their territory.  
Members of violent and armed groups such as guerrillas usually do not fall under the 
legal term  ‘refugee’ and are therefore not entitled to claim the right to protection.12 A 
distinction between violent and non-violent – but politically active – individuals within the 
population seeking protection is thus enshrined in international legislation. However, in 
                                                 
11 The restrictions on political rights are formulated in Article III: ‘1.) Every refugee has duties to the country in 
which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conforms with its laws and regulations as well as 
measures taken for the maintenance of public order. He shall also abstain from any subversive activities against 
any member States of the OAU. 2.) Signatory States undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their respective 
territories from attacking any Member State of the OAU, by any activity likely to cause tension between member 
States, and in particular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio’ (Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2002; 
Lawyers Committee 1995). 
12 Membership itself does not exclude one from refugee status, but previous actions and participation in war 
crimes and crimes against humanity do (Goodwin-Gill 1996:97). 
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reality this distinction can be difficult to draw. Here I will not enter into the legalities of 
this issue, but merely point out the complexity of the ensuing social reality. For example, 
the difference between a movement’s political and armed wing might be quite unclear in 
practice. Another issue is that some refugees have been recruited by force. Furthermore, 
there are families of soldiers living in camps – are they to be allowed visits from the 
soldier when he/she is off duty? In addition there are soldiers who enter refugee camps to 
rest and recuperate after fighting. The distinction between military and political activity is 
thus blurred in many settings. As we shall see, this is also the case with Sudanese refugees 
in Uganda. 
The international legal framework enables international legal and practical 
protection and assistance from the moment a persecuted individual crosses an international 
border. This also provides a possibility for the opposition within the country of origin to 
leave the conflict zone and work on organizing in a more peaceful and protected 
environment. The legal framework thus presupposes borders between sovereign states, and 
enables international protection and assistance. Hence, the international legal framework 
itself might constitute an opportunity structure for mobilization.  
Refugee Management and Policy 
Refugee management as carried out by the UNHCR and humanitarian organizations is 
twofold: providing protection and providing assistance. Sometimes there is a tension 
between the two (Jacobsen 1999, Whitaker 2003). Human rights advocates have criticized 
the UNHCR, NGOs and donors for giving priority to practical assistance interests when 
making decisions, while putting protection considerations in second place (Whitaker 
2003:153). Often the international refugee regime is faced with the dilemma of having to 
choose between delivering assistance and securing protection. This is grounded in the 
distinction between the UNHCR’s two primary roles: to deliver humanitarian assistance, 
and to protect refugees.  
Both protection and assistance measures influence refugee mobilization. This 
section will discuss the impact of four factors on refugee mobilization. These are welfare 
distribution, settlement policy, the guiding principles of ‘durable solutions’, and 
humanitarianism. In different ways these factors shape refugees’ opportunities and 
constraints for political mobilization. 
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In Uganda, the division of responsibility between the UNHCR and the host state is 
blurred. In theory the role of the UNHCR is to advocate and monitor the protection and 
assistance of refugees, while the host state as a signatory to the Geneva Convention is the 
responsible executive. In practice, the UNHCR plays a major role, by having primary 
responsibility for the procedures of determining refugee status (RSD) in Uganda, and even 
more through their financial assistance. The UNHCR has financed salaries for government 
officials, and health and education services for refugees and has in that way been able to 
control refugee policy (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:37–39). One of the problems 
with the UNHCR’s executive role in RSD processes is that the UNHCR thereby assumes 
‘the adjudicatory role’ (ibid:17). It is difficult for the UNHCR to advocate refugee rights 
and monitor the national RSD process, when they themselves are the ones who implement 
it. 
Still, the UNHCR’s possibilities and ability to operate independently depend on the 
host state, which regulates access and operational contexts. The UNHCR has several times 
been hindered access to and/or prevented from carrying out activities by host states, and 
this again compromises its autonomy and legitimacy (Loescher 2003b:6). In Uganda the 
UNHCR representative was deported by the government in 2003 because of disagreement 
on protection measures concerning the Achol Pii refugees (Kaiser 2005:360). 
Both the international refugee regime and the host state are responsible for and 
influence refugee management and policy in Uganda, so some of the issues discussed in 
this chapter will also be taken up in the next chapter on the role of the host state. For 
example, settlement policy is discussed in both chapters: the institutionalized aspects of 
camps and settlements will be the focus in the present chapter, while the actual context and 
placement of settlements will be central in the following chapter.  
Welfare Distribution 
The international refugee regime serves as a welfare distributor under conditions of crises 
and conflicts. The literature on refugee mobilization points to the advantages that 
humanitarian operations can bring, in the form of food and safe havens for oppositions 
operating in exile. The distribution of food aid and control of the distribution process are 
powerful tools. In Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, refugee status was made conditional 
on membership in one of the Pakistani-recognized political parties, and relief goods were 
distributed through appointed representatives among the refugees. These were called 
maliks (’bosses’) and were appointed by the Pakistani authorities (Terry 2002:67). In the 
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Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire (DRC) in the aftermath of the genocide, Hutu militants 
hid among the refugees and controlled many of the camps. Some relief agencies 
intentionally provided soldiers with food, arguing that they would otherwise steal from the 
refugees (Lischer 2003:83).  
Most refugees in Uganda are allocated a plot of land, normally 100m by 100m per 
family/household. The quality of the land varies, as does household capacity to grow 
produce (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:226). Some settlements have experienced 
insecurity which has also affected household production. According to the UNHCR, an 
increase in food distribution was required for 2004.  
Welfare distribution is carried out by the UNHCR’s implementing partners, which 
are various NGOs. For example, food distribution is organized by the UNHCR, which 
ensures that the WFP13 delivers food to the settlements, while implementing partners are 
responsible for distribution within the camp. Food delivery committees, elected among the 
refugees, are usually involved with distribution; they also provide the OPM14 with lists of 
persons living in a particular zone. Refugee Welfare Committees (RWC) can play an 
important role in these processes. The RWC is elected among the refugees in a settlement, 
and is usually composed of respected, vocal, and sometimes well-educated individuals 
(interview with key informant).  
Refugees sometimes sell distributed food on the local market, usually in order to 
obtain other necessary commodities, such as matches. This is usually frowned upon by 
relief agencies, but is also acknowledged as an important survival strategy. This in turn 
means that local markets are affected by the refugee population and the relief economy that 
comes with it (Merkx 2000). Refugees who live in areas too remote for this activity are 
more vulnerable and more dependent on aid distribution. 
The UNHCR together with the GoU has tried to implement a ‘Self Reliance 
Strategy’ for Sudanese refugees in Uganda. Launched in 1999, it was intended ‘to integrate 
the services provided to the refugees into regular government structures and policies’ and 
to move ‘from relief to development’ (cited in Kaiser 2005:355) One problem with the 
self-sufficiency policy was that the UNHCR and implementing partners had not invested in 
                                                 
13 World Food Programme 
14 As indicated earlier, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) is in charge of refugee management on the part of 
Ugandan authorities. This is explained in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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strengthening local health and education structures, so these local structures lacked the 
capacity for dealing with refugees  (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:43). 
What is the influence of welfare distribution on mobilization processes among 
refugees? Access to resources, especially food, is a valuable asset. The fact that refugees 
are given land, and that at least the aim of the relief programme is self-reliance, can help to 
make refugees less dependent on the international refugee regime, and less vulnerable in 
relation to those who control the distribution system. However, food scarcity remains a 
common problem. A significant number of refugees are in need of food aid, and their 
dependence on relief makes them vulnerable to the power exercised by the elected leaders 
in the camp. A position for example within the RWC can therefore provide an important 
opportunity to mobilize. Food distribution is not conditional on membership in a political 
party, but it requires that the recipients live in settlements and have refugee status. In this 
way, the international refugee regime contributes to separating refugees from the local 
population. Welfare distribution is one of the ways in which the refugees are gathered 
physically – which is also an important opportunity structure for mobilization. Settlement 
policy is another important way of gathering people.  
Settlement Policy 
Refugee camps and settlements are the most widespread institutionalized measure for 
refugee assistance and protection. According to the UNHCR, 4.7 million persons were 
residing in camps or similar arrangements in 2003, which corresponds to 36% of persons 
of concern to the UNHCR (UNHCR 2005:55). In Africa, camps are more prevalent among 
the population of concern to the UNHCR than elsewhere; they are almost twice as likely to 
live in camps (60%) as in Asia (34%) (UNHCR 2005:55)15.    
Loescher (2003) is critical towards refugee camps because of what he sees as the 
increased threat of militarization of refugees. He argues that refugee camps are a 
significant instrument for armed exile groups: 
Refugees can be ‘warehoused’ in refugee camps for years, even decades. Without hope and 
despairing of the future, some refugees turn to violence and become easy recruits for terrorist 
networks. Armed militia and criminal elements often take refuge in refugee camps and use 
them for recuperation and to recruit and to mobilize for ongoing conflicts in their countries of 
origin. (Loescher 2003:35)   
                                                 
15 There is variation in what is termed ‘camp’ with regard to the degree of organized structure, size and isolation. 
In its statistical yearbook , the UNHCR classification is broad, and refers to ‘camps and centres’. 
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Loescher thus emphasizes the refugee camp as a structure especially convenient for armed 
elements among the refugee population. For a guerrilla to move into a refugee camp is also 
characterized as one of the most successful strategies of guerrilla warfare, because of the 
legitimacy drawn from the refugees and the control mechanisms in refugee camps (Rufin 
1993, in Terry 2002:8). It is known that the Sudanese guerrilla movement, the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), has been recruiting support and soldiers 
in refugee camps in Ethiopia (Johnson 2003), in Kenya and in Uganda (Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005). 
To provide assistance and protection to refugees through placing them in closed 
political, social and geographical structures, as most settlements and camps can be 
described, has been widely criticized.16 Particularly strong is the criticism put forward by 
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005) in Rights in Exile: Janus-Faced Humanitarianism. 
They refer to the confinement of refugees to camps as a violation of human rights and as a 
‘cruel and dehumanising absurdity which neither economic nor political factors can 
justify.’ (ibid: 338) 
Other studies see the refugee camp as an institution of control, and sometimes 
compare it to a prison. Malkki (1995) has analysed the refugee camp in Mishamo in 
Tanzania this way – the camp as an institution of control.  She draws upon the perspectives 
of Foucault in her analysis, and these theoretical lenses render visible the controlling 
elements of the camp as an institution. This she shows through a sort of discourse analysis 
of refugee narratives, and a comparison between refugees in the camp, and in the town. 
Malkki reveals how the refugee camp as a technique of power enables and fosters the 
development of a socio-political collective identity (Malkki, 1995). In Malkki’s view, the 
refugee camp is an institution that segregates refugees from the outside world and controls 
them, while also providing an environment conducive to the formation of a strong 
collective identity.  
In Uganda, refugees are required to live in settlements, and the UNHCR and its 
implementing partners have taken responsibility for providing assistance in these camps.17 
One study of refugee rights in Uganda and Kenya argues that ‘The model of segregated 
                                                 
16 For examples other than those mentioned further on in this section, see for instance Harrell-Bond (2000) or 
Crisp and Jacobsen (1998). In addition, the US Committee for Refugees has launched an international NGO 
campaign against refugee camps, titled ‘anti-warehousing’. 
17 Refugee settlements in Uganda are referred to both as ‘camps’ and as ‘settlements’ in this thesis, following the 
UNHCR’s broad classification.  
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camps increases the potential for abuse rather than enhances the protection of refugee 
rights’ (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:15). The same study points out that refugees in 
settlements in Uganda do not enjoy the right to freedom of movement – a point reinforced 
by the isolated locations of many of the settlements (ibid: 15–16). This also has 
implications for refugees’ possibilities of engaging in business or trade and thereby being 
able to make a living for themselves (ibid: 16; see also Jacobsen 2002). The camp structure 
undermines the refugees’ possibilities of participating in trading, or other economic 
sectors. In other words, their livelihood is weakened by the same policy that is supposed to 
assist and protect them 
An important implication of the encampment and the restriction of freedom of 
movement has been insecurity. ‘In both Kenya and Uganda, the social make-up of camps 
made it impossible for refugees to enjoy the right to physical safety from internal strife and 
their location subjected them to rebel attacks from outside’ (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 
2005:16). Insecurity for refugees in camps and settlements thus stems from people within 
the refugee population and from rebel movements outside.  
Settlement policies can influence refugee mobilization. A focus on settlements and 
camp structures, to ensure that refugees are physically gathered in one place, also acts to 
separate and in some instances isolate refugees from nationals, as well as making the 
refugees’ activities controllable. In this sense, settlement policy can be seen as an 
opportunity structure for mobilization. One idea that reinforces the use of settlements in 
refugee management is the focus of aid organizations on repatriation, which has been 
singled out as the most important durable solution to a refugee situation. 
 
Durable Solutions 
A cornerstone in the UNHCR’s policy is the principle of the three ‘durable solutions’ for 
refugees. These are return to the country of origin, resettlement in a third country, or host 
country integration. The UNHCR has focused more on return than the other two solutions, 
since the 1990s were declared to be the ‘decade of repatriation’ for the UNHCR. In 
consequence, refugee policy has been guided by an emphasis on return. This means that 
the refugees’ condition is characterized as temporary – even in protracted and long-term 
refugee situations. 
Repatriation has been criticized for the inherent assumption that return to a life 
before flight is better than what life can be in exile: ‘Because post-repatriation life, or 
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“home” in the discourse of repatriation, is rooted in the country of origin it is considered 
by outsiders to be necessarily better than life in exile’ (Hammond 1999:230). 
During my fieldwork, many refugees were anxious to learn whether I believed that 
return would be a voluntary procedure. Often they would say things like ‘if the UN tells 
me to leave, I will leave.’ Some refugees would initially say that they wanted to return. But 
when I asked more specific questions, it turned out that most of them were rather 
suspicious about the return, and that they would take many things into consideration before 
actually returning for good. What many refugees did was to apply a transnational strategy 
to return, keeping one foot in each country. For example, one family member would be 
sent to Sudan to assess the situation and to set up a tukul (a traditional house) to secure 
access to land, while the rest of the family stayed in Uganda. Then they would move back 
and forth. 
The focus on return has implications for the integration of refugees in the host 
country. Especially when crises are protracted, as for the Sudanese refugees who have been 
living in Uganda for some 15 years now, temporary solutions may not be adequate. The 
increased focus on refugee repatriation has led to integration becoming a forgotten 
solution, even though some scholars argue that integration is often the most viable solution 
for refugees:  
Respect for the human rights of refugees can only be improved once encampment is 
abandoned as the policy of choice and integration is again pursued as the best solution. 
Integration is after all the solution that historically has been the predominant and probably the 
most successful one. (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:338) 
 An increased focus on integration might influence refugee management measures 
such as the use of refugee camps, and thereby policy on durable solutions might influence 
political opportunity structures for refugee mobilization as well. 
Humanitarianism 
Grounded in the Geneva Conventions, the most important principles of humanitarian aid 
are impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian assistance is to be provided to 
persons in need on both sides of a conflict, and is based on the principle that all human 
beings have equal dignity. Humanitarian actors emphasize the non-political character of 
their actions in order to create a ‘humanitarian space’ in war, disconnected from political 
claims and positions in the conflict (Terry 2002:19). This humanitarian space is important 
for the legitimacy of humanitarian aid, and for the conditions in which it can operate. 
 45 
However, the humanitarian imperatives and the organization’s dependence on donations 
may also have a negative impact on refugees. 
Humanitarian organizations have been taken to task for their insistence on the 
neutrality of refugees. Describing photos of refugees in a calendar made by the UNHCR, 
Malkki (1995) criticizes this depiction of refugees as only a human body, stripped of 
everything that could be personality- or culture-specific:  
The discursive constitution of the refugee as bare humanity is associated with a widespread a 
priori expectation that, in crossing an international border, he or she has lost connection with 
his or her culture and identity. (Malkki 1995:11)  
Categorizing refugees as human beings without history, experience, culture, or tradition is 
a way of representing them as infants, as newborns without a past or an established 
identity, and thereby as something distinct from other human beings. Analysing the 
political impact of representing refugees this way, Hannah Arendt wrote about the refugees 
of the Second World War: ‘the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their 
greatest danger’ (Arendt 1973:300). The consequences of depicting refugees as mere 
victims means a depoliticizing and ‘depowering’ of people, which again legitimizes that 
the decisions should be taken by someone else than the refugee themselves. Representing 
refugees as non-political, bare human beings, can justify their needing to be told what is 
best for them.  
In a classic study of refugee assistance Imposing Aid, Harrell-Bond (1986) argued 
that humanitarian aid agencies operating in Southern Sudan were paternalistic in relation to 
refugees. Among refugees in Uganda this may also have been the case. Many refugees, 
especially from urban areas, felt bereft of human dignity in their encounters with the 
UNHCR and their implementing partners (interviews with primary respondents). Another 
scholar made the same observation during her fieldwork among young urban refugees in 
Kampala:  ‘For most refugees, the way they were treated at the UNHCR and InterAid 
offices reflected a very negative, not to say deeply humiliating experience.’ (Lammers 
2005:5). A study of refugee assistance among Sudanese in northern Uganda also argued 
that assistance agencies view refugees merely as recipients of aid, not as partners in local 
development and community building (Merkx 2000:22). 
Ideas of humanitarianism may influence refugee management, and thereby influence 
opportunity structure for refugee mobilization. Humanitarian ideals can reinforce policies 
that bring about exclusion and isolation of refugees.  
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Concluding Remarks 
The international refugee regime influences the political opportunity structure for refugee 
mobilization. The legal framework makes possible international refugee protection and 
assistance, and this in turn influences refugee mobilization. Refugee management and 
policy can influence mobilization, as welfare distribution may give access to resources, and 
settlement policy can lead to physical gathering or isolation of the refugee population, 
which again entails a control potential. Refugee camps and settlements can hinder 
integration with the local population, to a certain extent forcing refugees to seek 
opportunities and security within their own community. These processes are reinforced by 
the focus of international aid organizations on repatriation and the idea of humanitarian 
action as being something fundamentally apolitical. 
As previously indicated, a conflict between assistance and protection measures may 
arise in refugee assistance, where priority is usually given to assistance measures rather 
than protection. This is sometimes explained by the view that relief organizations in 
practice feel more accountable in relation to their donors than to the recipients, in this case 
the refugees (Terry 2002, Lischer 2003). Organizations like the UNHCR are therefore 
encouraged to focus their efforts on protection of refugees: ‘While individual governments 
may feel uncomfortable being criticized, UNHCR will gain greater respect in the long term 
for speaking up for refugee protection principles than for remaining silent.’ (Loescher 
2003b:16).  
Protection of refugee rights – both human rights and specific refugee rights – is one 
of the primary roles of the International Refugee Regime. In this sense, the international 
refugee regime is a structure that can secure the rights of refugees to political mobilization, 
as in the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. Considering this, one might 
assume that the international refugee regime can have a different influence on political 
mobilization among refugees, one which does not victimize and depoliticize, nor serve to 
fuel militarization. 
However, the international refugee regime is not the only factor that influences 
refugee mobilization. The roles played by the host state and the exile community itself are 
also important in understanding refugee mobilization. 
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4) The Host State 
How does the host state influence political mobilization among refugees? This is what I set 
out to explore in this chapter. The host state provides an important opportunity structure 
for refugee mobilization in the sense that it is the political authority governing the area in 
which refugees are living. According to the Geneva Convention, the host state (if 
signatory) is responsible for the protection of refugees (Vevstad 1998). In turn, refugees 
have an obligation to respect and abide the laws of the host state. Refugees have thus both 
rights and duties in relation to the host state.  
Normally the concept of political opportunity structure is used to analyse the 
structure (usually the state) that some person or group is mobilizing in opposition to. In this 
study, the concept needs to be altered slightly, as the refugees are mobilizing in opposition 
to the state they are fleeing from. At the same time, the host state has an influence on this 
mobilization. I will analyse how the host state affects refugee mobilization by applying the 
concept of political opportunity structure. Analysing the political opportunity structure in 
relation to the host state is therefore different in the sense that the refugees do not primarily 
engage in trying to change the political authority that provides the opportunity structure. 
Still, the host state’s policies towards refugees serve to shape their possibilities and 
constraints for political mobilization.  
In particular, this chapter will discuss how the GoU’s exclusionary or inclusionary 
practices influence political mobilization among Sudanese refugees. The focus will be on 
refugee policy in Uganda, and on whether the host state uses refugee rebel movements as a 
proxy in its own war against a neighbouring state.  
The Situation in Uganda 
For decades people have been forced to move because of war and insurgencies in the area 
around the border between Sudan and Uganda. Refugees from Uganda have moved back 
and forth across the border, depending on the vagaries of the political situation in the two 
countries. One Sudanese, Peter, who is currently living in Kampala, gives an account of his 
movements ever since he was born: 
 48 
I was born in Uganda [1972] in Kitgum district, not far from where our place in Sudan is.  I 
grew up in Sudan, where I went to primary school in Torit and Nimule and in Page, near the 
border. When I was in Primary five the war started. Then I had no school for three years. 
Primary six and junior one I did in Parojok [Sudan] after that. Then I went to Kitgum 
[Uganda] with my auntie. But it was very hard for us in Kitgum, the LRA attacked the 
refugee camp. Also the Museveni army [UPDF] disturbed the camp, so in 1989 I decided to 
go back to Sudan and to my village. But because of the war, life became difficult for us. In 
1993 we fled again from Sudan to Uganda and came to Kiryandango. (interview in Kampala, 
March 2004) 
As Peter’s experiences illustrates, the border area has been unstable for many years, 
and migration both ways has been frequent. His story also shows that several armed actors 
have been involved in destabilizing the area; normally these include at least the GoS’s 
forces, the LRA, SPLA and UPDF. 
Since the current president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni seized power in 1986, the 
northern part of the country has been plagued by rebel activity, civil unrest and political 
marginalization. Currently there are around 1.8 million IDPs, most of them living in camps 
and reliant on humanitarian aid, in northern Uganda(OCHA 2005). The living conditions 
for these IDPs are extremely harsh, and mortality figures are higher than in Iraq (UNDP 
2005). The rebel movement Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was started in 1987 and has 
operated in northern Uganda and southern Sudan since then. It has been characterized as an 
especially brutal army, known for abductions of children. In 2005, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for five LRA commanders, accusing them of 
crimes against humanity. IDPs in the north are also exposed to human rights abuses by the 
UPDF army, although to a lesser degree than from the LRA. UPDF abuse has been 
criticized recently by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who point out that 
abuse by the national army is especially serious as this army is deployed to protect the 
civilian population (IRINNEWS, 13 January 2006). 
There is also an international dimension to the war in northern Uganda, as the LRA 
has had a safe haven in Sudan and has received financial and military support from the 
government there at least since 1994 (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999:28). At the same time, 
the GoU is supporting the SPLM/A, the Sudanese opposition guerrilla movement. 
Uganda’s fight against the LRA is supported by the USA as a part of the latter’s interest in 
restraining the regional influence of the Islamist government in Khartoum. The local 
conflicts thus have regional and international dimensions as well. For refugees, the 
presence of so many armed actors in the area creates a general situation of insecurity. 
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Refugee Policy: Protection or Security?   
When a Sudanese in need of protection crosses the border from Sudan to Uganda, he /she 
is required to register at the border and apply for refugee status. Most Sudanese are given 
refugee status according to group recognition, after an interview with UNHCR and OPM 
representatives. When a person has received refugee status, he/she is allocated to a 
settlement. One representative of the Ugandan authorities in Adjumani district explained 
the procedure this way: 
When they are accepted as refugees they are given some minimum basics, and then they are 
given a piece of land in one of the settlements. The land is given by the district authorities, 
and then filled up. The first settlement here [in Adjumani] was Magburo. In relation to 
protection my work is to protect refugees physically, morally. There are police posts and 
military establishments in the camps, to protect them. (Interview with OPM Adjumani 
Refugee Desk representative) 
Uganda’s refugee policy requires refugees to live in settlements, a practice dating back to 
the Second World War, when the country became host to European refugees, Poles being 
the largest group (Gingyera-Pinycwa 1998:5). These refugees were, under the British 
Colonial administration, located in camps in remote areas. Since then, Uganda has hosted 
large groups of refugees, especially from Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, Kenya and other 
countries in the region. A total of 236,000 refugees were registered in Uganda in 2003 
(UNHCR 2005), so it can be said that Uganda has been generous host to displaced people. 
At the same time, the conflicts in Uganda have been producing refugees of their own. 
Currently the number of IDPs is the most serious case, with some 1.8 million displaced 
people living in camps in the northern part of the country (OCHA 2005). This issue, 
although important, will not be a central topic in this thesis, however. 
The 1960 Control of Alien Refugees Act (CARA),18 which provides the legal 
framework for refugee policy in Uganda, basically defines refugees as a security issue, and 
emphasizes control over the refugee population. CARA is consistent neither with the 
Geneva Convention nor with the OAU Convention, both of which were ratified by Uganda 
after 1960. Main criticisms of CARA include that refugees are defined as a class of aliens 
who without papers can be subject to imprisonment; that refugees’ freedom of movement 
is restricted; and that refugees can be dispossessed of their property (Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005:29–31). The GoU is currently processing a new Refugee Bill, intended 
                                                 
18 The Control of Alien Refugees Act (1960), Chapter 64 of the laws of Uganda. 
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to bring the country’s refugee law more in line with its other international legal 
obligations. The work with the Refugee Bill came in the aftermath of Uganda’s 1995 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights, but the process of approving the Refugee Bill has been 
very slow. At the time of my fieldwork, the Bill was in process, and at the time of writing 
it has still not been approved. Thus, CARA has remained the valid document. It is 
criticized for being an instrument to control rather than protect refugees, and for requiring 
refugees to live in settlement camps, which violates refugees’ right to freedom of 
movement (Garry 1998:67). Although CARA is not followed as strictly as before, its most 
important legacy is a ‘culture of centralised control’ (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 
2005:31). 
Administrative responsibility for refugees lies with the Directorate of Refugees 
(DoR) under the Minister of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees in the Office of the Prime 
Minister (OPM). The Directorate has desk officers appointed to various districts 
responsible for supervising commanders and officers in the settlements (Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005:37). The OPM is thus the acting authority in relation to refugees.  
During my fieldwork, I had to adjust to the requirements from the OPM. Even 
though I had been granted official approval from the Uganda National Council of Science 
and Technology (UNCST) as well as from the Resident District Commissioner in both 
Kampala and Adjumani, it proved necessary to ask the OPM for extra permission. In 
Kampala the UNHCR and Inter Aid refused to talk to me without OPM permission; and in 
order to go to Adjumani, to visit refugee settlements, OPM permission was required.  The 
OPM thus functions as a parallel system in relation to refugee research and thus to refugee 
administration in general, mostly because of the security dimension. The OPM is the host 
state’s acting authority towards the refugees. When I asked the OPM representative in 
Adjumani whether he thought the eventual return of Sudanese would be a voluntary matter, 
he answered: 
We will apply a minimum amount of force, for example we will withdraw the assistance. Not 
to everybody of course, like some people we know, they will probably be imprisoned or 
killed or revenged if they go back, because of what has happened in the war. (OPM Refugee 
Desk Officer in Adjumani district) 
Although CARA has not been strictly applied in Uganda (Lomo et al. 2001), it does 
inform refugee policy. Refugees in Uganda are confined to live in settlements, many of 
these situated in remote areas, and some close to the border. Refugee assistance is 
conditional on refugees residing in settlements. But partly because of the insecurity in 
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refugee camps, many refugees come to live in Kampala (Bernstein 2005). This is not 
usually allowed, except for those permitted for security reasons through the ‘Urban 
Caseload’– currently 210 refugees (Bernstein 2005:8). 
On the one hand, Uganda’s refugee policy focuses on controlling refugees – but at 
the same time, the policy is to allow the SPLM/A to operate in the country. Thus we see 
that the political opportunity structure is contributing to the SPLM/A’s strong position in 
exile. 
The SPLM/A’s presence is unofficially tolerated by the Ugandan authorities. This 
becomes particularly evident through the position of the SPLM/A membership card, which 
serves as an important ID card in Uganda, often giving Sudanese protection from being 
detained and harassed by the police. One of the interviewees had kept his membership card 
in order to move freely, although he had left the SPLM/A and was in fact fleeing from 
them. He used the card to cross the border into Kenya as well. 
Several high-ranking SPLA officers have houses in Kampala. Although many are 
also based in Nairobi, I was told that many of them prefer to have their children in school 
in Uganda. One international diplomat involved in the peace negotiations told me that 
many high-ranking officers in the movement even have Ugandan passports, making 
international travel easier. 
Both the control element of refugee policy and the support of the SPLM/A are 
important for understanding how the host state can influence refugee mobilization among 
Sudanese in Uganda. The host state as an opportunity structure will in the following be 
discussed through three factors: settlement, livelihood and insecurity. 
Settlement 
How can settlement policy in the host state influence refugee mobilization? GoU refugee 
policy requires most  refugees to live in settlements in remote areas. This represents an 
obstacle to freedom of movement and to refugee’s possibilities of being included in 
economic and political activity in the host country. Kaiser (2005) attributes this to the host 
state’s focus on repatriation as the solution to the refugee policy and argues that integration 
would be a better solution in terms of development policies towards refugees. 
Confining refugees to settlements in remote areas and restricting their movements 
also prevent refugees from participating in small-scale trading and other economically 
productive activities (Jacobsen 2002:593). This leaves many refugees idle in camps, 
especially those who have been allotted poor land and cannot sustain their families by what 
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they can produce on it. Moreover, through this exclusion the host state misses the 
opportunity of gaining from what refugees could contribute to the economy (Jacobsen 
2002).   
Many refugee settlements are situated close to the border, for example Adjumani 
district, which hosts many Sudanese settlements (see map, Appendix III). It is well known 
that the SPLM/A is present in the areas in northern Uganda bordering Sudan. Especially 
since the SPLM/A captured Yei and the area leading up to Yei, the road from Arua in 
northern Uganda through Koboko has been an important way of accessing Southern Sudan 
by road. The SPLM/A also uses the road through Adjumani to bring supplies from Nimule 
to Yei. 
SPLM/A recruitment activity has been frequent in many refugee settlements, and 
this has been more or less tolerated by the host state (Hovil 2001, Verdirame and Harrell-
Bond 2005). The SPLM/A has also been able to carry out recruitment activities in city 
centres, in areas where many Sudanese live (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005).19 
However, it seems that settlements which gather many Sudanese in one place situated close 
to the border are most convenient for refugee mobilization.  
Host-state policies on settlement can influence mobilization both through the type of 
settlement (as in self-settlement versus refugee camps) and its location (close to/distant 
from the border). The combination of refugee camps and a location close to the border 
seems to provide greater opportunities for refugee mobilization activities.   
Livelihood 
For refugees some livelihood opportunities are offered by the host state (and some by the 
international refugee regime), while other opportunities are self-acquired. The host state’s 
main contribution to refugee livelihood opportunities is the land that is provided. A key 
informant describes the distribution of land this way: 
Ideally the land is given to families/households in about 100 by 100m, although this varies 
from camp to camp and depends on land available per refugee in every camp. The principle 
applies equally for unmarried individuals and in some instances to UAMs [Unaccompanied 
Minors]. When a family expands, technically the land holding should also expand, although 
there is evidence that this takes long. 
 That refugees are given land by the government means that they can be more independent 
and self-sufficient than otherwise. However, the quality of the land is often poor, and there 
                                                 
19 How this recruitment activity is exercised is described in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
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is considerable variation in the number of people in a household, as well as their ability to 
cultivate land. Other livelihood opportunities are therefore pursued – such as petty trade, 
poultry raising, or remittances if the household has relatives abroad. Petty trade can be 
difficult if the settlement is located in an isolated area. As shown in the previous chapter, 
food aid is offered by the international refugee regime in some instances. 
Uganda has had a restrictive approach to employment of refugees, and this is 
retained in the new refugee bill. Moreover, an employer is allowed to pay refugees less 
than their Ugandan counterparts, especially if the work is related to a refugee settlement 
(Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:217–218). 
Education is another factor that is relevant for livelihood opportunities. The UNHCR 
has provided primary education in the refugee settlements. Secondary schools have been 
present in some, most of them started as self-help initiatives. There have been few 
opportunities for support to tertiary education, the Hugh Pilkington Trust Fund being one 
of the alternatives. In 1998, Makerere University decided to charge the same fees from 
refugees as nationals, whereas they had previously been charged as international students. 
(Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:256). 
Many Sudanese, if they can afford it, send their children to school in Uganda and go 
back and forth to Sudan. Refugees often cited the good educational opportunities in 
Uganda as an argument for not wanting to return to Sudan as soon as the peace accord was 
signed. They would rather wait for themselves or their children to finish their schooling in 
Uganda, as educational opportunities are scarce in southern Sudan. A Sudanese I 
interviewed in Kampala (a primary respondent) had recently moved there from Nairobi 
where her closest family live, in order to attend a better secondary school in Kampala 
while staying with extended family in Kampala. She was born in Khartoum, had lived in 
Ethiopia, moved to Kenya, lived in Kakuma before her family moved to Nairobi. Her 
father is currently working in Sudan and paying for her education. Thus, her educational 
opportunities were self-acquired. People with funding and resources also have access to 
education. Income can also buy a Ugandan ID card, according to a key informant: ‘Many 
Sudanese can obtain status as Ugandan through “graduate tax ticket”. It requires name, 
physical address and money. Many Sudanese study at Makerere, but it is difficult to know 
exactly how many because some of them pass as Ugandan.’ (Key informant) 
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Apart from funding from relatives there are some official funding possibilities, 
through the UNHCR, OPM, JRS20 and other NGOs. As one refugee in Adjumani 
explained: ‘I then got a scholarship from OPM to go to Arua for two years of studies in 
business administration. That was in 1999 and 2000. Since 2001 I have been working with 
this NGO.’ (interview with Elijah) 
One consequence of the existence of educational opportunities is that refugees move 
to city centres. ‘There is a growing number of urban refugees, basically because of the 
security situation in the camps, and because of education opportunities’ (interview, key 
informant). Generally, urban refugees do not receive support, so this opportunity is 
reserved those who can get a scholarship or who have private funding. 
Livelihood opportunities are worse for refugees living in isolated and insecure 
places and where the quality of the land is poor. Opportunities are few, dependence on 
food assistance is high, and educational opportunities are scarce. For those refugees with 
access to resources, there are better opportunities in trading, education and so forth. Such 
differences may influence mobilization in the sense that the SPLM/A can provide 
opportunities for those who otherwise have none. Poverty, and lack of possibilities, may 
serve to make mobilization an attractive alternative. 
Insecurity 
Many Sudanese refugees in Uganda live in a situation of insecurity – especially those 
placed in settlements close to the border. The quest for security is important, and if the host 
state cannot provide security, it has to be sought within the exile community. 
During a group discussion in a refugee camp in Adjumani district, refugees said 
‘One of our problems is that the GoU didn’t place us in a safe location. Every night we 
sleep in the bush because of these rebels.’ (Group Discussion, Mireyi) 
Sudanese refugees in Uganda have been both the subject of control on the part of the 
Ugandan authorities and victims of  insurgencies in the north: they have not been 
sufficiently protected by the host country. Sudanese refugees are threatened by rebel 
attacks, and the host state is supposed to provide protection. I asked the OPM 
representative about the security situation; the following is an excerpt from the interview:    
                                                 
20 Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) is one of the implementing partners of UNHCR in Uganda 
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How is the security situation for the refugees in this district? It is ok. Sometimes back it was 
worse, but now it has improved. We still have some pockets of insecurity. Like Maaji and 
Magburo. But people in the settlements are telling me that they are sleeping in the bush 
because they are afraid? You know, everybody perceives the situation different. Some people 
maybe like to open the window in their office, others not, it is up to each and everyone. Just 
like some people sleep in the bush and others not.’ (Interview with OPM Adjumani Refugee 
Desk representative) 
The GoU has insisted on minimizing the LRA problem and on trying to solve it by 
military means. Every time the government announces that the LRA is so weak that it will 
be defeated the next week, the LRA comes back even stronger. For internally displaced 
Ugandans and for the Sudanese, the LRA is a constant threat and has created great fear 
(UNDP 2005). The government is criticized for not been able to protect its citizens. 
Similarly it has neither protected the Sudanese from the attacks (Kaiser 2005). The best 
solution with regard to such external threats to refugees would be to move them further 
away from the insecure areas of the border region. 
Sudanese refugees in Uganda are also a part of a landscape of huge groups of 
migrants and displaced peoples. There are refugees fleeing from the war in Southern 
Sudan; but there are also Ugandan refugees who fled to Southern Sudan in the 1980s, who 
went back to Uganda in the early 1990s because of intensive fighting in Southern Sudan. 
And there is a huge population being internally displaced in northern Uganda due to the 
war in the north and the GoU’s policy of organizing ‘Protected Villages’ (Kaiser 2000:50). 
Refugee camps are an easy target for the rebels, so many refugees have fled from their first 
camp to friends and family staying in other camps, further away from the border. This is 
technically illegal, according to the GoU’s refugee policy (Kaiser 2000), and further 
complicates life in refugee camps already short on resources. 
 One possible consequence of insecurity for political mobilization may be that some 
refugees decide to join armed forces in order to protect themselves. This was suggested by 
an SPLM/A representative: “Most people that were in Achol-Pii are soldiers. They want to 
go back and they want to beat the rebels” (interview, primary respondent). As mentioned, 
Achol-Pii was a refugee camp in Pader that was attacked by the LRA in 2002. Many 
Sudanese were killed and some abducted. The camp was later closed down (Kaiser 2005). 
Another element complicating the (in)security situation is that many refugees are 
fleeing from atrocities committed by the SPLA, especially refugees from Equatorial Sudan 
who initially did not support ‘the movement’ (Kaiser 2000:45). Insecurity in settlements 
has also been caused by internal threats such as forced recruitment by the SPLM/A (see 
chapter 5 for a longer discussion of this). The OPM admitted that this was a fear: ‘Some 
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people fear abduction, usually we would then move them to another place. Sometimes they 
go for resettlement in another country.’ (Interview with OPM Adjumani Refugee Desk). 
Insecurity may also lead to further displacement (Kaiser 2000, Okello et al. 2005) as 
well as to return: 
The situation in the settlements now is that every person is ready to go back. But it is not yet 
known what is happening, for example the people that were displaced from Maaji last year 
because of the LRA insurgents. Now, when this happened, many people decided to go direct 
to Sudan. But some are remaining in Adjumani because of educational programmes or those 
that are single parents. (Interview, primary respondent) 
Insecurity and displacement may also affect educational opportunities for some, as 
pointed out by a teacher at Alere Secondary School, a boarding school for Sudanese in 
Adjumani.  ‘Alere is ok, but if parents are displaced, the children are affected, because it 
gets harder for the parents to pay the school fees.’ (interview with primary respondent)  
Refugees who live in insecure areas may seek protection elsewhere when the host 
state and the international refugee regime are not able to provide adequate protection. 
Thereby an opportunity rises for refugees to organize protection among themselves – and 
this is a space where the SPLM/A has been able to take advantage of opportunities and to 
offer alternative security measures. 
Refugees as Instruments of Foreign Policy? 
When refugees and host states become involved in a conflict which at first was internal to 
the refugees’ country of origin, the conflict spreads across international borders and thus 
becomes regionalized. 
Raids and guerrilla activity across the border may drag the host state into an existing conflict, 
and in fact this may be the deliberate strategy of armed exile groups. The offer of sanctuary to 
refugees may in itself invite military retaliation: in response to real or perceived threats of 
‘refugee warrior communities,’ refugee camps have increasingly become military targets. In 
some cases host states have themselves armed or helped to arm refugee fighting groups as a 
weapon against the country of origin, but then found themselves unable to control the 
consequences of having done so. This occurred in the Great Lakes region of Africa, resulting 
in the destabilization of the entire region in the late 1990s. (Loescher 2003:35) 
As pointed out by Loescher, the militarization of refugees and refugee camps may 
eventually lead to regional destabilization involving neighbouring states. In the case of 
Sudan and Uganda, the conflict in Sudan has had a destabilizing effect on the situation in 
Uganda, but, at the same time, the situation in Uganda has spilled over to Sudan. The role 
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of the host state in the regional situation affects refugees, and here both the relationship to 
the country of origin (in this case Sudan) and the insurgency (SPLM/A) is important.  
This section discusses whether refugees are dragged into the conflict as instrument 
in a conflict between neighbouring states. It therefore discusses relations between the 
governments of Uganda and Sudan, as well as between the SPLM/A and the government 
of Uganda.  
The Relationship between the GoU and the SPLM/A 
The GoU supports the SPLM/A politically but – officially – not military. However, there 
are indications that the SPLM/A also receives military support. Despite the prohibition on 
‘subversive activities’, the SPLM/A is tolerated in Uganda – not only its political but also 
its military activities (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:200). However, it is unclear to 
what extent the GoU has supported the SPLM/A, and to what extent the GoU has actually 
influenced the SPLM/A. 
An SPLM representative in Kampala told me he was the ‘bridge between SPLM and 
the government of Uganda.’ He went on to explain that the GoU supported the SPLM, but 
not officially the SPLA. He also told me that one can move around freely with an SPLM 
membership card, and that some commanders even have Ugandan passports. He added that 
the membership card can be used in other East African states, such as Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Zimbabwe (interview with Paul). 
A Sudanese SPLM/A representative told me:   
Many Sudanese prefer to live in Uganda, because it is safer than Kenya.  In Kenya foreigners 
are more harassed and in risk of detention. In Uganda the membership card protects. Also, the 
education system is better here. Many people have their children in school in Uganda and go 
back and forth to Sudan themselves. (Interview with Daniel).  
On 20 March 2004, the Ugandan government paper New Vision printed an article saying 
‘Premiership brings SPLA men to Koboko town’. The article was in the sports section and 
a part of a series of articles presenting various sports venues. This time it was presenting a 
pub in Koboko, a little town close to the Sudanese border. From  the article: ‘… this is 
where SPLA officers take time off the war with the Sudan army to watch the English 
Premiership.’ This article – in a government paper – illustrates how the presence of SPLA 
commanders in Uganda is in practice accepted. 
Also, an SPLM/A representative in Uganda, involved in recruitment of soldiers, told 
me: ‘I was in Kiryandongo just before Easter. A commander from inside came and brought 
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people back. Now they have gone inside to fight the LRA. They are fighting together with 
UPDF. And we will catch them!’ (interview with primary respondent). 
The UPDF participated in the SPLM/A offensive in 1997, where among others, the 
town of Yei was captured. One of my interviewees had been in Yei at the time. ‘They are 
collaborating a lot with UPDF. Even I remember when Yei was captured I came down to 
Kaya, still in Sudan, and I realized it was our [Ugandan] soldiers, NRA21 people.’ 
(interview key informant) 
There are also indications that the UPDF has participated in the SPLM/A forced 
recruitment activity in Adjumani in Uganda. One Sudanese refugee in Adjumani was asked 
whether the SPLM/A were cooperating with UPDF, and answered: ‘Yes, when they came 
for this recruitment thing there were some UPDF soldiers. People knew because some of 
the soldiers didn’t speak Arabic.’ (Int55). This might just be a rumour among Sudanese, 
but other studies have documented that the UPDF assisted the SPLM/A in forced 
recruitment activities in Adjumani district (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005: 176, Hovil 
2001). It has also been asserted that SPLA soldiers store their weapons in UPDF barracks 
while visiting refugee camps (Hovil 2001). 
When I asked the OPM representative about this issue he answered: ‘Sometimes the 
SPLA they come and people sing, and they go back to fight, but we don’t think people are 
being recruited forcefully.’ (Interview with OPM Adjumani Refugee Desk). This answer 
would at least indicate that SPLM/A recruitment activities are tolerated.  
To which extent is the GoU actually able to control or influence the activities of the 
SPLM/A? What are the criteria for defining the support as waging a war of proxy? Uganda 
has an interest in supporting the SPLM/A both ideologically and in fighting the LRA, but 
perhaps not in waging war against the GoS – at least not in the sense of controlling its 
territory. On the other hand, the GoU has evinced a positive attitude towards a regime 
change in Sudan. In the mid-1990s, Uganda formed an unofficial alliance together with 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, known as the Front Line States (FLS), which aimed at the downfall of 
Bashir’s regime (Ofcansky 2000:200).22 The signing of the peace agreement (CPA) has 
changed this situation, as the SPLM/A is now part of the regime in Sudan. The official 
                                                 
21 National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) was the guerilla movement led by Yoweri Museveni who 
seized power in Uganda in 1986. The government army UPDF is therefore sometimes referred to as NRA. 
22 This did not last long, as war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998, and relations between Ethiopia 
and Sudan improved. 
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relationship between the GoS and the GoU is thus improving; its future will depend on the 
implementation of the CPA. 
 
The Relationship between the GoU and the GoS 
Uganda has a troubled relationship with Sudan, where both countries have a history of 
supporting each other’s opposition groups. A relevant question is therefore: Are Khartoum 
and Kampala engaging in war of proxies, thereby turning refugees into instruments of 
foreign policy?  
Historical relations between Uganda and Sudan can be characterized as not 
amicable, though not always officially directly hostile. Both the Obote regime and the 
subsequent Amin regime in Uganda supported the Anya Nya rebels in the first civil war in 
Sudan (Ofcansky 2000:196). Later when Amin’s regime fell, pro-Amin soldiers fled to 
Southern Sudan and launched cross-border raids from refugee camps. The Obote II 
government in Uganda asked Sudan not to support the pro-Amin soldiers, but Khartoum 
refused to expel them (idem).  
Museveni came to power in 1986. At his inauguration he pledged that his 
government would represent a ‘fundamental change in the politics of our country’, and also 
stated that regional stability and cooperation would be important in Uganda’s foreign 
policy (Ofcansky 2000:196). When Museveni and the NRM/A23 overthrew the regime of 
Okello, thousands of UNLA soldiers 24 fled to Southern Sudan, where they were received 
and supported by the GoS. The GoS used the UNLA to defend garrison towns in Southern 
Sudan against attacks from SPLA (Ofcansky 2000:197). At the same time, UNLA was 
fighting the NRM/A in cross-border attacks. 
In 1987 Museveni went to Khartoum for talks with the GoS. The parties agreed 
‘Sudan should not allow Ugandan rebels to use its territory as a platform or Uganda to 
allow Sudanese rebels to stay in its territory’ (Sudan Times, 14 June 1987, quoted in 
Ofcansky 2000:197). But despite this agreement, the GoS continued to support anti-
Museveni forces inside Sudan and the GoU kept up its support to the SPLA. In 1989 
relations between Sudan and Uganda worsened. Officials from the two governments met in 
Kampala and agreed not to fight along the border, and to move refugee camps at least fifty 
                                                 
23 National Resistance Movement/Army 
24 Uganda National Liberation Army 
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miles from the border. However, both countries lacked resources and political will to put 
this agreement into effect. The result was that refugee flows kept crossing the border, the 
SPLA still received support from Kampala and the GoS kept on supporting anti-Museveni 
groups in Southern Sudan (Ofcansky 2000:198).  
The most problematic rebel movement for Uganda is the LRA, which has been 
operating from bases in Sudan since the early 1990s. According to Prunier (2004:364), the 
GoU did not support the SPLA directly until 1993, as Museveni wanted to improve 
relations with Khartoum. The split in the SPLA after the fall of the Mengistu Regime in 
Ethiopia strengthened GoS access to the Ugandan border, and initiated support to the LRA 
(ibid:366). In 1995, troops from the GoU supported an SPLA attack against the towns of 
Parajok and Magwe, where the GoS held positions (Ofcansky 2000: 199). 
This picture had not changed by the time of my fieldwork. The two governments are 
still negotiating agreements concerning insurgencies, but the on-going peace process 
between the SPLA and the GoS has improved relations between the two states. Uganda 
(UPDF) has been allowed to cross into Southern Sudan in fighting the LRA, and the SPLA 
is supporting the UPDF in fighting against the LRA inside Southern Sudan. The GoU 
therefore has taken the SPLM/A side in their conflict against the GoS, and this has 
implications for mobilization. One of my interviewees in Uganda had mobilized soldiers 
and contributions to the SPLM/A in order to fight against the LRA inside Sudan, in support 
of the UPDF (interview with primary respondent).  
Concluding Remarks  
Uganda as a host state for Sudanese refugees influences refugee mobilization through its 
official refugee policy and administration, and through the GoU’s support to the SPLM/A. 
This means that the host state’s policy is contributing to strengthening the SPLM/A’s 
possibilities for mobilization in exile.  
The host state, Uganda, defines refugees as a separate group, and requires them to 
live in separate place, which prevents refugees from local integration and opportunities. As 
argued in the previous chapter, such isolation of refugees influences mobilization, since the 
Sudanese are defined and gathered as a group. Livelihood opportunities offered by the host 
state might make refugees less dependent on the resources offered by mobilization, but 
when livelihood opportunities are scarce – and this is the situation for most refugees – this 
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may affect mobilization, making resource opportunities an effective carrot for 
mobilization.  
Most Sudanese refugees in Uganda live in a situation dominated by insecurity.  
When the host state cannot protect refugees from insecurity, they may have to seek other 
ways of getting protection. This in turn can provide an opportunity for mobilizing groups 
to offer measures of protection from within, and may therefore influence the form that such 
protection takes. An insecure environment can thus fuel military recruitment as a measure 
for protection.  
Refugee mobilization among Sudanese in Uganda is also influenced by the regional 
situation, where the SPLM/A has become a partner in the UPDF’s fight against the LRA, 
which also corresponds to UPDF support to the SPLM/A’s fight against the GoS. This is 
not necessarily a war of proxy in the sense that the GoU wants to defeat the GoS, but the 
GoU clearly supports one side of the conflict in Sudan. The situation for Sudanese refugees 
in Uganda is marked by these regional aspects, and by the host state’s support to the 
SPLM/A, which has contributed to the strong position of the SPLM/A in Uganda. 
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5) The Exile Community 
How is refugee mobilization influenced by political and social factors within the exile 
community? The chapter begins by describing the various forms of political mobilization 
within the Sudanese exile community in Uganda. Then the relevance of collective identity 
in mobilization processes will be discussed. Finally, there is a discussion of the SPLM/A’s 
methods of control and authority, and how this influences refugee mobilization. 
In this chapter I choose to talk about ‘Sudanese in Uganda’ rather than ‘Sudanese 
refugees in Uganda’. In order to explore and understand the dynamics within the exile 
community I did not want to limit myself to interviewing only those with legal, official 
refugee status. ‘Refugee’ pertains first and foremost to various legal entitlements in 
relation to the international society and host state. Within the exile community, in relations 
among Sudanese, formal refugee status is not the most significant distinction, although it 
may matter – for example, if one receives economic benefits or resettlement opportunities 
from it. What constitutes the term ‘exile community’ in this thesis is whether people 
describe themselves as Sudanese. In Uganda, some Sudanese may manage to live as 
Ugandan, especially if they have money and can pay tax, and particularly if their 
background is from one of the cross-border groups (interview with key informant). This 
thesis does not aim at defining exactly what constitutes the ‘Sudanese community’: the 
focus is on how processes among Sudanese influence political mobilization. 
The Sudanese Exile Community in Uganda 
Within the Sudanese community in Uganda one finds a wide range of political 
involvement, from small local initiatives to the well-organized political and guerrilla 
movement SPLM/A.  Political mobilization activities range from the formation of peace 
and conflict resolution groups, to the recruitment of soldiers.  
The most ‘successful’ organization in terms of political mobilization is the SPLM/A, 
which has a predominant position both politically and militarily within the Sudanese exile 
community. The SPLM/A is therefore the main focus of this analysis, although we should 
bear in mind that it is not the sole expression of political mobilization among Sudanese in 
Uganda. 
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Despite the prohibition on ‘subversive activities’, in both Kenya and Uganda, as we have 
seen, the SPLA was tolerated – not only its political activities, but also military recruitment. 
Other groups found it much harder to organise associations for either cultural or development 
purposes. (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:200). 
The SPLM/A presence in Uganda was visible, among other things, through its office in 
Kampala, called ‘the Chapter’. There are SPLM/A chapters in many countries outside 
Sudan – also in Norway. At the chapter/office, members can meet and membership cards 
are issued. Travel permits to go inside SPLA-controlled areas in Southern Sudan are issued 
from here. The chapter is also involved in recruitment of soldiers among Sudanese in 
Uganda. The Kampala office had no signboard outside, and was difficult to find. A 
representative of the office administration explained that one of their most important jobs 
was to maintain good relations with the Ugandan authorities. The SPLM/A’s humanitarian 
wing, the SRRA25, is also present in Kampala, with a separate office. Also this office 
issues travel permits for rebel-held areas in South Sudan. One of their main tasks is 
maintain contact with the international NGOs that operate in Sudan, and to approach 
potential new donors. 
One reason why the SPLM/A has acquired a dominant position is that many refugee 
associations have had difficulties registering with the authorities, which in turn makes it 
more difficult for them to receive funding from external sources (Verdirame and Harrell-
Bond 2005:200). Other organizations among Sudanese in Uganda experienced difficulties 
in finding resources and mobilizing people for their work. Most common amongst these 
were organizations focusing on social development issues, like women’s organizations, 
youth organizations or students’ organizations. Some were organized in relation to a 
specific area or group in Sudan, for example ‘Upper Nile Youth’ or the ‘Dinka Society’. 
Others worked to include various groups of Sudanese, like ‘South Sudanese University 
Students Association’ (SSUSA(ug)) or ‘Sudanese Young Women Empowerment Network’ 
(SYWEN). SYWEN had actually managed to obtain official registration as an NGO. In 
2003 they organized a conference to discuss the peace negotiations, where they challenged 
the SPLM/A on women’s issues. At the time of my fieldwork, however, the organization 
lacked funding. Among the organizations for Sudanese in Uganda, the emphasis was put 
on social and development issues, and focusing on the situation inside Sudan, but avoiding 
more political questions. The Sudan Human Rights Association (SHRA) differed from 
these. It published a newsletter, held training sessions on refugee rights and published 
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reports criticizing human rights abuses committed by the SPLM/A as well as by the host 
government and the UNHCR (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:201). Among the 
Sudanese interviewed in my fieldwork, however, the work of the SHRA was mentioned 
only by a few university students and educated Sudanese in Kampala. This suggests that 
their mobilization potential might be limited to the educated elite outside the SPLM/A, and 
dependent upon external financing. 
Religion and churches emerged as an important factor with regard to mobilization 
among Sudanese in Uganda. Religious leaders and churches may not be a classic example 
of political mobilization, but within the Sudanese exile community they are important for 
collective meetings and assembly. There are several examples of associations and small 
gatherings that take place in churches. This might mean that the church is seen as a 
practical structure where people can get together: they meet for Mass, and afterwards they 
can gather for social and political discussions. As an institution, the Church is probably 
also important not only because it can offer a physical meeting place, but also as a social 
and religious community, providing protection, assistance and hope for many refugees. 
This is also why maintaining good relations with the churches has been important for the 
SPLM/A and vice versa. I return to a discussion of the role of religion and churches later in 
this chapter.  
SLPM/A has a strong political and military position in Uganda, and especially in 
relation to Sudanese in Uganda.  As Johnson (1998) emphasizes, within Sudan the 
SPLM/A has focused on building up an organization in opposition to the government in 
Khartoum. 
The SPLA has been revolutionary in some of its language but not in its approach. This is 
because in its origin the SPLA has been defensive: it has attempted to defend the integrity of 
the South in the face of attempts by a succession of central governments to dismantle 
Southern administration and subordinate the South politically, culturally and economically. 
(Johnson 1998:71) 
The SPLM/A thus has aimed at including all Southerners and has focused on the struggle 
against the regime in Khartoum. 
Although aiming to be an including organization for Southerners, the SPLM/A has 
also approached mobilization in a militaristic way, through forced mass- and individual 
recruitment, which has caused resistance and scepticism. Johnson (1998: 71–72) rejects the 
notion that the SPLM/A is a centralized military structure, and argues that it is organized 
                                                                                                                                                    
25 Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, SPLM/A’s humanitarian wing. 
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through semi-autonomous commands, and that locally the organization has worked with 
native administration, like the chief’s court.  He sums up the success of the SPLM/A this 
way: 
(...) it has also established the basis for a series of local alliances which not only enabled it to 
overcome the crisis of internal Southern factionalism, but to link up with former enemies 
within the nation and the region, placing it at the centre of a formidable political and military 
alliance pitted against the Islamist government in Khartoum. The leading role now played by 
the SPLA, an essentially Southern Sudanese army, is unprecedented in post-independence 
Sudanese politics, and constitutes a revolution in itself. (Johnson 1998:72) 
In exile, though, such native and local structures are generally weaker or lacking, 
and this might have made it easier for the SPLM/A to gain an even stronger position within 
the exile community. Hence, in Uganda the SPLM/A’s ‘local alliances’ might be the host 
state and the international refugee regime, making the SPLM/A less dependent on alliances 
with traditional elders. 
The SPLM/A is the dominant organization among Sudanese in Uganda. How has it 
reached and maintained this position? Previous chapters have shown how SPLM/A has 
been able to profit from the political opportunity structures in the international refugee 
regime and the host state; here we focus on how the organization relates to its constituency 
within the exile community. The SPLM/A’s political mobilization among Sudanese in 
Uganda will be understood and discussed through collective identity processes and 
methods of control. 
Collective Identities and Political Mobilization 
Can the SPLM/A’s capability to mobilize Sudanese in Uganda be understood through its 
ability to accommodate a range of different collective identities? These collective identities 
relate to political, ethnic and religious divisions within the Sudanese exile community. One 
salient political conflict is between adherents of unity for Sudan, and those favouring the 
separation of Southern Sudan. The SPLM/A has never taken a clear stance on this issue, 
but it can be assumed that most of its members are in favour of separatism, while its 
leaders advocate unity through the notion of ‘New Sudan’. 
Ethnic divisions are articulated through the oppositions between ‘African and Arab’, 
as well as on the level of the various ethnic groups. This is particularly evident when it 
comes to the Dinka identity and its relation to other identities among the Sudanese. Both 
these distinctions have had implications for mobilization, as well as having been reinforced 
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by mobilization processes. Political mobilization and military training has been organized 
along ethnic lines, as one key informant pointed out when we were discussing challenges 
in the peace process: 
The peace process is crucial especially when it comes to inter-ethnic relations. This has to do 
with the ‘kokora’ which is a Bari word signifying ‘live where you belong’. I would say that 
the SPLA all the time has had a policy of kokora. I was a refugee myself in Yei from 1983. 
And I was captured by the SPLA for military training, and the training was done along ethnic 
lines. (Key informant, interview in Kampala) 
Another key informant pointed out that the GoU also separated the Sudanese refugees 
along ethnic lines, and he mentioned the concentration of Dinkas in Mireyi settlement as 
an example (interview, key informant). I will come back to this issue in discussing the 
Dinka Identity. Finally the role of religion and the relationship between the SPLM/A and 
the churches and church leaders will be discussed.  
Unity versus Separatism 
As one key informant pointed out, ‘Garang is a minority in the SPLA in not wanting 
separatism, but the New Sudan’ (interview with key informant). Many Sudanese in Uganda 
(and elsewhere) are separatists wanting an independent South Sudan.  They define the war 
in South Sudan as fundamentally between the North and the South of this vast country, and 
are convinced that the solution is to split the country in two.   
The contrast between unity and separatism is also a question of the relationship 
between the membership and the leaders in the SPLM/A. However, the possibility of an 
independent South Sudan is included in the CPA, and it would probably be very difficult 
politically for the SPLM/A to negotiate without having this possibility included. On the 
other hand, people are sceptical about the interim period, and express a sense of distrust 
towards Northerners. 
Once the peace is signed leaders have to win the mind of the people to vote for independence. 
People are desperate for material resources, so my fear is that people can be lured materially 
to vote for unity. (Interview, primary respondent) 
This person is also sceptical about other Southerners. He fears that votes can be bought and 
that this will determine the outcome of the referendum.  
One Sudanese expressed his separatist opinion when asked about the on-going peace 
process: 
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Youths don’t have anybody at the negotiation table. I am sceptical to the agreement, 
specifically to the notion of an integrated force, how will these youths be able to serve in the 
same army and to trust each other? What is the SPLA’s philosophy? Separation or unity? 
South Sudan is not only the SPLA. There is a need for a South to South dialogue on the 
question of governance. (interview with Zackary) 
Zackary also links the question of separation or unity to the issue of governance and power 
sharing within the South. The question is a political struggle within the movement and 
between Southerners, and was one reason for the split in the SPLM/A in 1991 (Johnson 
1998). Two commanders in the Upper Nile area were central in the Nasir faction: Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol. Though the reasons for the split were many, a central issue was the 
separatist agenda. Now the faction has again been incorporated into the SPLM/A, and both 
Machar and Akol have central positions. After the death of Garang in late July 2005, 
Machar became vice president of the government of Southern Sudan (GoSS).  
One Sudanese in Uganda was with the Nasir faction when it split. He explained the 
differences between Machar and Garang through their differing perspectives on an 
independent South: 
In 1997 Machar made peace agreement with the GoS but many of the people got corrupted. 
And the peace accord was disturbed. Now Machar is cooperating with Garang. But Machar 
say we should divide Sudan according to the British agreement, but Garang he talk about 
New Sudan. (int7) 
‘New Sudan’ was first used in an SPLM/A manifesto of 1983. What it signified was the 
new government that the SPLM/A was fighting for, in that they sought to replace the 
current government in Khartoum (Rolandsen 2005:119). After the split in 1991, where the 
Nasir faction demanded a separate South Sudan, the concept was not used by the SPLM/A 
until the National Convention process in 1994. This time, a more separatist meaning of the 
concept was included, in connection with reference to a referendum on self-determination 
(Rolandsen 2005:118–22). The separatist agenda was thus included in the concept of New 
Sudan, although the SPLM/A did not restrict itself to the liberation of South Sudan26 (at 
least not as defined in the 1956 colonial agreement). ‘New Sudan’ as a concept was thus 
politically more malleable than ‘South Sudan’. Although the SPLM/A has been vague on 
                                                 
26 The wording of the National Convention Resolution referred to five regions: ‘We the people of the New Sudan, 
represented by this Convention, proclaim the birth of the New Sudan, which for the time being, shall consist of 
Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile Regions (..)’ (as quoted in 
Rolandsen 2005:121). 
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the question of separatism, it is become more incorporated in their politics than during the 
first years of the civil war.27  
The effect of competition from the Nasir faction strengthened the separatists’ position within 
the SPLM/A. John Garang found himself in the contradictory position of needing to 
champion self-determination in order to compete with the Nasir faction for support among 
southerners, while simultaneously denouncing separatism in order to maintain co-operation 
with the NDA28. (Rolandsen 2005:42) 
The SPLM/A has managed to mobilize both separatists and unionists, but separatists are 
sceptical about the leadership. This is something that might have changed after Garang’s 
death, when Salva Kiir took over the leadership, with Machar advancing to vice president. 
Both Kiir and Machar are expected to have a more separatist agenda than Garang. On the 
other hand, Kiir has underlined that he will follow the implementation of the CPA, which 
entails a national solution as well as a referendum on separation after an interim period of 
six years. Thus, an inherent paradox in the CPA is the inclusion of both unity and 
separatism. 
Ethnic Identities and Political Struggles 
The Sudanese in Kampala live and organize in relation to ethnicity, which is the baseline for 
belonging. But it is also a security dimension to this, that they feel safer together with people 
from the same tribe or clan. So you could say it’s a kind of coping mechanism in the situation 
they’re in. (interview, key informant) 
Ethnicity is indeed central to the Sudanese in Uganda. This section will discuss how ethnic 
identities influence mobilization processes. 
One Sudanese in Kampala who was deeply involved with the SPLM/A was active in 
mobilizing soldiers among Sudanese in Uganda. For example, there was an incident during 
my fieldwork where he received a letter from the SPLA administration in an SPLM/A-
governed county in Southern Sudan, requesting the mobilization of soldiers and equipment 
for them. He was basically asked to mobilize among his own ethnic group. Interestingly he 
operated in Kampala as well as in refugee settlements in northern Uganda, and across the 
border in Southern Sudan. As he said: ‘I am also involved in mobilizing soldiers and I will 
be going to a meeting for soldiers in Nimule [Sudan] by the end of this month.’  The 
border area is very porous between Sudan and Uganda, and mobilization activities on both 
                                                 
27 During the first years of the civil war, SPLM/A was also dependent upon support from Mengistu’s regime in 
Ethiopia. As this regime opposed separatism (they were fighting Eritrean separatists) this left little room for 
support for a separatist SPLM/A. 
28 National Democratic Alliance is an umbrella for the northern opposition groups in Sudan. 
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sides of the border are coordinated. Some of the ethnic groups are cross-border groups as 
well. 
On a general level, SPLM/A policy is to work to unite different groups of Sudanese 
to work together for the unification of the South, and for peace among Southerners. In 
practice, however, much of the work is organized along ethnic lines, as it was in the 
example of the mobilization of one ethnic group. This indicates a tension between wanting 
to organize the Sudanese with basis in unity, and the practice of organizing and mobilizing 
along specific ethnic lines. 
Ethnicity is also used as a form of resistance and/or scepticism against the SPLM/A 
through accusations that it is dominated by one group. Thus, a challenge for the SPLM/A 
is to appear as an organization that can include various identities in order to mobilize 
broadly among the Sudanese. This section will discuss how ethnic identities shape political 
mobilization. We focus on the level of the different ethnic identities, with the Dinka 
Identity as an example, and then on another level concerning the difference between 
‘African’ and ‘Arab’. 
The Dinka Identity 
During my fieldwork I noticed that Sudanese would talk about the characteristics of 
different ethnic groups, describing people in terms of which ethnic groups they belong to. 
Most people referred to their ‘home’ place not as the actual place where they were born or 
grew up, but where they belonged in ethnic terms. The most mentioned ethnic group and 
most outstanding example was the Dinka. 
The biggest challenge for peacebuilding is to reconciliate with ourselves. Most people see 
only one side. Ethnic divisions between the Southerners, especially Dinka/not Dinka. The 
Dinka are said to be not educated and they are not friends with the Equatorians, but now they 
have changed and interact more, at least in Rubaga. But they [Equatorians and Dinkas] don’t 
live together, they live in separate houses, but interact in the different recreation centres 
around in the neighbourhood. (interview, primary respondent) 
Within the Sudanese exile community in Uganda, there exist divisions among the various 
ethnic groups, but particularly between Dinka and non-Dinka. This quote points to the 
situation in one urban district of Kampala, but the divisions were even more apparent in 
Adjumani, in the North. One primary respondent (above) stressed the division between 
Dinka and Equatorians, but also there exist divisions between Nuer and Dinka: 
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My worries are the conflicts among the tribes. For example last year there was a big fight in 
Palorinya [refugee settlement] in Moyo [northern Uganda] between Nuer and Dinka. It was 
the youth playing cards and then they started insulting each other, it turned into a big fight, 
and even the women had to run away. OPM was called and arrested some of them. (Interview 
with UNHCR representative Pakelle Sub Office, Adjumani) 
The civil war that erupted between Nuer and Dinka inside Sudan in the 1990s as a result of 
the 1991 split caused more tension between the groups in exile. Now the situation is calmer 
and the leaders are reconciled, but suspicions still linger between the groups.  
In Adjumani, one of the places I visited was Mireyi refugee camp, where most of the 
refugees are Dinka. They presented themselves as someone more foreign, and different 
from other Sudanese refugees. In Mireyi Refugee Camp they told me they were cattle 
people, not farmers, and therefore couldn’t grow their own food; moreover, they are not 
used to eating beans, which is what they were given by the UNHCR. Mireyi was initially a 
transit camp established in 1994. Most refugee settlements in Adjumani district are partly 
self-sustaining, in line with the UNHCR Self Reliance Strategy (Merkx 2000), but Mireyi 
is completely dependent on food aid (interview with UNHCR representative, Pakelle 
(Adjumani)). In Adjumani district,  Maadi, Acholi and Bari-speaking people (among 
others) are living. These are groups also found in the Equatoria region across the state 
border to Sudan. By contrast, the Dinkas originally come from further north in Sudan 
(from the south and middle of the country). 
Interestingly, when I told other people in Adjumani that I had been to Mireyi, 
several would ask: ‘were you afraid?’ and they would add that most people in Mireyi are 
soldiers that used to live in Ethiopia. I did not verify these accusations, but it was true that 
a few of those I interviewed in Mireyi had been to Ethiopia, and had been soldiers. In a 
group discussion with some refugees in Mireyi, they explained it this way: 
This settlement was created in 1994, and most of the refugees here are youths, and most are 
Dinka, some are Nuer. We are around 3000 refugees living here. And most of the people 
living here were refugees in Ethiopia before they came here.’ (Group Discussion 3, Mireyi) 
Up to 1991 and the fall of Mengistu’s regime, Ethiopia hosted many Sudanese refugees. 
Also the SPLM/A was supported by Ethiopia and operated from bases within the country, 
and was accused of recruiting among refugees and setting up training camps (Johnson 
1998). However, this does not mean that all those Sudanese that were previously in 
Ethiopia are soldiers, and even if they were, it does not follow that they still are. 
Still, especially from Equatorians, the identification of the Dinka with the SPLA was 
strong, among both Ugandans and Sudanese (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:128). 
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‘Mireyi had gained a reputation as a ‘rest and recreation’ for members of the SPLA: armed 
men could often be seen marching from Mireyi to the border.’ (Verdirame and Harrell-
Bond 2005:128). Even though Mireyi was known to be a militarized camp, UNHCR kept 
placing all Dinka (and Nuer) in this camp, even if they were defecting soldiers. And this in 
turn probably made young unaccompanied minors especially vulnerable to forced 
recruitment (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:204).  
I met considerable suspicion and talk about ‘the Dinkas’ in my fieldwork. People 
would tell me that the Dinkas are harsh, aggressive, arrogant and want to be superior. Like 
one Sudanese in Adjumani town: 
The Dinkas are different. They can disturb you. They are very harsh and proud. They want to 
decide, and they feel superior. Here I can sit down and talk to my neighbour if he is a Dinka, 
but once you get to Sudan, they are the ones to decide. And you should not be in their way. 
Here [in Uganda] they keep to themselves, but not really disturbing us. (Interview, primary 
respondent) 
Many Sudanese had negative attitudes towards Dinkas. Some Equatorians accused them of 
having started the war, and in 1983 when the war began they initially decided not to 
participate. Also, some Ugandans who had been refugees in South Sudan in the 1980s 
remembered SPLA attacks on refugee camps, and had coupled the SPLA with the Dinkas 
since that time (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). One Ugandan key informant explained 
it this way: 
In Sudan there was a resentment of the other tribes against the Dinka for having started the 
war. Especially for the tribes involved in the Anyanya who made a peace agreement.  (..)They 
[SPLA] have several groups in command, but the Dinkas will always decide in practice. Like 
you will have a Bari Major and a Dinka commander. Their opinion is that all these other 
Southern tribes descend from Dinkas; they are seeing themselves as the supreme.’ (key 
informant) 
Among several Equatorians, both Ugandan and Sudanese, suspicion and stereotyping of 
Dinka prevail. One Dinka student said that he had experienced this, and did not feel 
comfortable with it: 
Initially the SPLA was only Dinka. Many people they don’t like Dinka. I meet people here 
that ran away from the SPLA. Many are suspicious against Dinka. Even in the scholarship, 
they say it is for minority students, so we are only three Dinka among the 60 Sudanese 
students, even though we are the largest ethnic group. There are even Dinka dialects that I 
can’t understand.’ (Int12) 
This may imply that there exists a kind of racism against the Dinka. Indeed, Dinka 
experienced discrimination in health care and rations and scholarships as well (Verdirame 
and Harrell-Bond 2005:129). 
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The Dinka issue is rooted in political debates in Southern Sudan. The SPLA 
leadership has often been criticized of being Dinka-dominated, and their leader John 
Garang was a Dinka. During the first years of the war the SPLM/A gained considerably 
less support in Equatoria than elsewhere because they were seen as a Dinka army.  Upper 
Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal, inhabited mostly by Dinka and Nuer, remained the SPLM/A’s 
main recruiting areas (Johnson 1998). But ‘Dinka domination’ is also a question of sharing 
power within the South. As one Sudanese in Adjumani told me, even though he was 
sympathetic towards the movement he was sceptical about ‘Dinka domination’. I should 
add that he himself belonged to one of the ethnic groups of Equatoria. 
My other speculation is that are they going to address only the material things? There are 
some elements of domination. Is it a sufficient theory to explain the Dinka domination with 
the fact that they are the largest group?’ (interview, primary respondent) 
Even though the Dinka may have been more involved in fighting, and their identity has 
become militarized, there has been created a significant distinction between Dinka and 
others among Sudanese in Uganda, rooted in the view of the Dinka as warriors and as 
being more foreign. This may prove important when it comes to mobilization. Or – might 
it also be a result of mobilization? 
 The stereotyping of Dinka by non-Dinka among the Sudanese in Uganda entailed 
an essentialist view of what a Dinka is. Interestingly, the Dinka, as opposed to other ethnic 
groups in Sudan, are in fact not a unified ethnic group – ‘the Dinka’ consist of a group of 
tribes (Holt and Daly 2000:3). Also, Dinka people have been found on different sides of 
national and regional politics in Sudan (Johnson 2003:51). 
Ethnic identity was also used as a reason for scepticism to the SPLM/A, as 
accusations of ‘Dinka domination’ was used by concurrent groups to challenge the 
leadership of the movement. Accusation of ‘Dinka domination’ forms part of a long history 
of opposition to the SPLM/A, and has also been a means for the Khartoum government to 
prevent the emergence of a united Southern Sudan (Johnson 2003: 51–53 and 67–69). 
There have been conflicts between Dinka and Nuer based on ethnicity (Jok and Hutchinson 
1999), and there is a history of conflict between Dinka and Equatorians (Branch and 
Mampilly 2005). In Uganda the conflict between Dinka and Equatorians is dominant, with 
the latter in the majority.  
In Yei (Equatoria), the SPLA was initially perceived by the people as an ‘army of 
occupation’ (Johnson 1998:70). The conflict between Equatorians and Dinkas can also be 
traced back to even before the beginnings of the SPLM/A. For example, General Lagu, the 
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Anyanya leader (from the first civil war), advocated the re-division of Southern 
administration, accusing the Dinka of having ‘tried to monopolize the political posts.’ He 
further stated: ‘It is time we cut the Dinka down to their original size. They must go home, 
they have nothing to do in Equatoria’ (from Badal 1994:120). These statements were made 
just before the inception of the SPLA and the beginning of the second civil war.  
Recently, when the new Government of South Sudan (GoSS) was appointed, the 
SPLM/A was criticized for ‘Dinka domination’: Dinkas occupied 45% of the seats but 
represented only 25% of the Southern population. The criticism also concerned other 
issues of power sharing within the South with reference to women and other political 
parties (IRINNEWS Nov 15th 2005). Thus the Dinka identity is also an issue in post-
conflict Sudan as well as within the exile community. 
The Distinction between African and Arab 
Another level of ethnic identity among Sudanese in Uganda relates to the distinction 
between ‘African’ and ‘Arab’. Among the Sudanese in Uganda, the ‘Arabs’ were the 
enemy – the GoS – in opposition to ‘the Africans’. In referring to a common enemy, the 
disparate ethnic groups in Southern Sudan could feel a common identity and common 
cause in being ‘African’ in opposition to ‘Arab’. Many Sudanese in Uganda considered 
unity and reconciliation among people in South Sudan as a prerequisite for peace, rather 
than a national solution and reconciliation that would include both ‘Africans’ and ‘Arabs’.  
In Uganda many Sudanese emphasized reconciliation among the Southerners as the 
most important challenge for peacebuilding, but I did not meet anyone who spoke about 
reconciling with the ‘Arabs’. The ‘Arabs’ were presented as the common enemy, 
something the people of the South should unite in opposition to. This is reflected in the 
words of Rebecca:  
I am active in Upper Nile Youth. We are thinking that we, as youth in Kampala, should unite. 
We want to make unity, as one people. Even though we have different leaders, but we decide 
to unite. For us black people, the only problem is the Arabs. (...) In the meetings we discuss 
different issues, like that the youth should unite. We meet in the church, and we are from 
seven different tribes.  (interview with Rebecca) 
Rebecca is a young Nuer and the youth organization is a new initiative, created as a 
consequence of the peace process. When Machar’s Nasir faction split from the SPLA in 
the early 1990s, war broke out between the Nuer-dominated SPLA-United led by Riek 
Machar and the Dinka-dominated mainstream SPLA (Jok and Hutchinson 1999). Now that 
the political leaders are united, possibilities have emerged on the ground for Nuer and 
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Dinka to organize together, also among young people in exile. This time ‘African’ is used 
as an identity that forms a basis for mobilization.  
‘African’ and ‘Arab’ were also categories referred to in relation to cultural 
distinctions. This became especially evident when Sudanese were asked about challenges 
related to a possible post-conflict return to Sudan. 
Also there is the problem of those people that stayed with the Arabs they have taken their 
culture. And people that stayed in Uganda have been accustomed to another culture. So we 
will need to find a way to reconcile within the community. (Interview, primary respondent) 
This indicates the fear of a conflict between those who fled and those who stayed behind. 
In addition there are Southerners who fled northwards, who for example lived outside 
Khartoum. Some of them had education and working experience in Arabic.  
Arabization has been an active policy on the part of the GoS (Holt and Daly 2000) 
especially through language and Islamization processes, particularly evident in the 
educational system. A Sudanese teacher in Uganda emphasized this as a challenge for post-
conflict Sudan. I then asked him which language he would want for the educational system 
in Sudan, and he answered: 
In English, but with freedom for Arabic. Many people from South they have education from 
the North, and they feel proud they know the classical Arabic. Now the university in Juba is 
moved, they said they reopened one section, but the mujahedin militia are still in Juba and in 
Torit. They are working with the GoS. (Interview, primary respondent) 
Sudanese in Uganda have received their education in English, and most refugees have had 
access to primary education (though of varied quality)29. In a post-conflict South Sudan 
there might be a conflict of job interests in deciding which language to use in a new school 
system. 
The term ‘Arab’ was also used with reference to the government in Khartoum, and 
to express distrust towards it: 
Also I am sceptical about the peace. Arabs, they will pretend to be good during the interim 
period but after independence they will not behave good. You know after repatriation people 
can move freely, for example they can go to the capital, so they can come and convince 
people just to attract their minds. In this interim period we should be careful in handling these 
Arabs so that they know what will happen. When they campaign they will not do it empty 
handed. (Interview, primary respondent) 
                                                 
29 For further information about refugees education opportunities in Uganda see Dryden-Peterson (2003) 
 76 
In addition to expressing scepticism towards ‘Arabs’, reference is made to the separation–
unity discussion as well. The assumption is that ‘Arabs’ would want unity, and that they 
will act in an ingratiating way with Southerners so that they will vote for unity. 
The distinction between Arab and African also came up in an interview while 
discussing the on-going peace process and the three disputed areas: 
How is the peace process going? Now there are difficulties with the three disputed areas. Why 
are these areas disputed? R: We are Africans we have to preserve our culture and identity. 
The people living in these areas, they are fighting with the SPLA now. They wrote a pan 
African petition, you can get it at the pan African movement office. (Interview, primary 
respondent) 
The distinction between African and Arab is a complex one in Sudan, particularly in 
central areas of the country. In most cases it is difficult to tell the difference merely by 
looking at people, due not least to many generations of intermarriage. This is for example 
the case for Darfur (Flint and de Waal 2005). The distinction, thus, is basically political, 
and needs to be seen in relation to political developments in Sudan. Holt and Daly (2000) 
emphasize the division between North and South, and African and Arab, as essential to an 
understanding of Sudan’s history:   
There exists a broad distinction, which is nevertheless slowly being modified by the processes 
of history, between the northern and southern parts of the modern Sudan. The north is, with 
certain important exceptions, Arabic in speech, and its peoples are largely arabized in culture 
and outlook. Its indigenous inhabitants are universally Muslim; a minority of Arabic-speaking 
Christians is composed of the descendants of immigrants from Egypt and Lebanon since the 
Turco-Egyptian conquest. The southern Sudan contains a bewildering variety of ethnic 
groups and languages. Unlike the northerners, its peoples are not generally Muslims, nor do 
they claim Arab descent; although there has been some degree of islamization and 
arabization. These tendencies were restrained during the Condominium period, when 
European and American missionaries effected a limited christianization of the region. (Holt 
and Daly 2000:2–3) 
Although the North/South, African/Arab divisions are important in Sudan, it is 
equally important to realize that it is only one of many political divisions in contemporary 
Sudan (Branch and Mampilly 2005:4).  
The SPLM/A aim at including both people that define themselves as Arabs and as 
African culturally – the over-arching aim is to fight the Khartoum government. The 
SPLM/A has first and foremost mobilized among Southerners, but also formed alliances 
with Northern opposition parties. How deep these alliances really go, however, is 
questionable.  
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Religion and the Role of the Church 
Especially in Western media, the civil war in Sudan is sometimes portrayed as a war 
between Muslims and Christians. This is a simplification, yet religion is one dimension of 
conflict in the Sudan. For many Sudanese refugees in Uganda, Christianity is something 
that can unite them, and the church and the religious community have become important in 
exile. 
Every first Sunday of the month there is a Catholic service for Sudanese in one of 
the cathedrals (Rubaga) in Kampala. The service is conducted in Arabic and led by 
Sudanese priests. I attended one of these and was introduced to the community at the end 
of the service by one of the priests. During the mass, he spoke about the peace process and 
how important it was for the Sudanese community to reconcile and support the peace 
process. This particular Sunday the congregation counted only around 60 people, but I was 
told that there were usually more. The priest said that he cooperates well with the Ugandan 
pastors, and added that sometimes churchgoers from both Sudan and Uganda attend the 
same services. However, one key informant told me that although there is a good 
relationship and cooperation between Sudanese and Ugandan pastors, there is not much 
contact with the Ugandan Catholic community. He also added that the Anglican [or 
Episcopal] Church had a refugee desk in West Nile.  
The religious community is important for many Sudanese refugees. Another key 
informant described the role of the church within the Sudanese community in Uganda this 
way: 
Both the Episcopal Church and the Catholic Church have been important for the community. 
They have social programmes and they have given hopes to the refugees. Especially for the 
most desperate ones, the church provides a sense of hope. To the extent possible they also 
provide a lot of help to people. The church has also been a meeting point. And they have been 
involved in peace processes. The SPLA respects them and see that they have power. And the 
church and the SPLA are separate structures. However, some individuals are deeply into the 
SPLA, that is also why the church couldn’t protect people against abuses and to speak up 
against Human Rights violence committed by the SPLA. But part of the Catholic Church 
defines themselves as part of the struggle, based on liberation theology. (interview with key 
informant) 
As pointed out in this quote, the church is an important institution and the Christian 
community provides hope, comfort and aid for many Sudanese refugees. Churches and the 
community also provide a place to gather.  In Adjumani I also went with Sudanese to 
attend a church service, and this time the church was overcrowded. Many of those I talked 
to expressed the importance of the church as a meeting place. Some organizations and 
youth groups used a church for meetings and the religious community as a point of 
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departure for organizing. Churches also have social programmes, support and education 
grants.  
One priest I interviewed in Kampala was also organized in the SPLM/A and an 
active recruiter for the organization. He was a refugee in Uganda, but also an ex-soldier. 
This suggests that there are close ties between the SPLM/A and the church, although the 
church and the SPLM/A are separate structures.  
The SPLM/A’s relationship with churches changed with the Islamist NIF30 coup in 
Sudan in 1989 and the establishment of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) the same year. 
Until then, the SPLM/A had been perceived as being hostile towards the church (African 
Rights 1995:7). The Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), who gathered churches in Sudan 
in an ecumenical forum coordinated from Khartoum, had difficulties in reaching out to 
churches in South Sudan (apart from government-controlled areas) when the second civil 
war broke out. In 1990 the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was formed, with the 
Roman Catholic Bishop Paride Taban as leader (Rolandsen 2005:75). The NSCC worked 
from Nairobi and in the SPLA-controlled areas in South Sudan. Christianity thus became a 
more salient identity for Southerners. This was also linked to national and international 
events like the Islamist coup in Sudan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War. These events 
opened up a space for a shift of alliances in international politics. Whereas the SPLM/A 
had been a Marxist-inspired rebel group allied with Mengistu in Ethiopia, and the regime 
in Khartoum was supported by USA, this changed after 1990. The SPLM/A has gained 
increased support from the USA in its fight against an Islamic regime, and especially 
Christian organizations in the USA have been important pressure groups and active 
advocates for Sudan, focusing on the religious dimensions of the conflict. 
The formation of the NSCC was encouraged by the SPLM/A, partly as a reaction 
against Islamization, and partly as a strategy for the delivery of humanitarian aid and 
improved goodwill on the part of Western donors (Rolandsen 2005:76). However, the 
SPLM/A has since then seen church organizations and the NSCC in particular as a 
challenger to its own ‘position as the legitimate spokesperson of the Southern People.’ 
(Rolandsen 2005:76). The question of its legitimacy as a movement for Southerners is a 
central question. It has therefore been important for the SPLM/A to respect and include the 
churches in its social work, while also keeping control of its political and social position. 
                                                 
30 National Islamic Front 
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Sudanese Muslim refugees were a minority in Uganda. There are Muslim 
communities in most parts of Uganda, and particularly after the Idi Amin period the 
number of Muslims in Uganda rose. Thus, on the part of the host state, there was no 
particular discrimination of Muslims. However, some Muslim refugees felt discriminated 
against and threatened by the SPLM/A. One example is this family, who lived in Mongola, 
a settlement in Adjumani district:  
(…) they are saying we Muslims have our names registered in the SPLA offices and we are 
considered as collaborators of the Islamic North [the government of Sudan], the Christians 
consider themselves as the ‘genuine’ ones collaborating with the SPLA. (…) (quoted in 
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:127) 
Even though the SPLM/A is careful not to announce itself as a Christian organization, 
Muslims are a minority in the movement, and they might feel discriminated against or at 
least not entirely included. 
However, it has also been important to the SPLM/A to function as an organization 
for Muslims who oppose the Islamist regime. Many ‘African’ Sudanese are Muslim, as is 
the case for example with populations in the Nuba mountains and in Darfur region. And 
many Southerners are neither Christians nor Muslims, but adhere to traditional religions. 
The SPLM/A therefore has tried not to focus on Christianity, in order to be able to include 
these differences. At the same time, though, a ‘nearness’ to Christianity and the Christian 
community has been important both inside Sudan, and for international support. 
Multiple Identities and Political Mobilization 
Multiple identities that are mutually reinforcing or excluding play a significant role in 
mobilization and in how the SPLM/A relates to its constituency. The SPLM/A has tried not 
to emphasize with one or the other, presenting itself as a broadly based organization (at 
least in its official policy), in order to accommodate the various views and be an attractive 
organization for all Southerners as well as for all Sudanese opposed to the Khartoum 
government. 
There are political, ethnic and religious divisions within the exile community, and 
the SPLM/A has tried to accommodate the opposites in order to mobilize. Particularly 
challenging is ethnicity. As Tvedt (1994) pointed out in his study of local civil 
administration in Southern Sudan, ethnicity as social category has been a major obstacle to 
building a viable government structure.  
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In southern Sudan, where ethnic groups as social categories have been more important than 
social class, one of the paramount problems in building up administration has been one of 
‘ethnic arithmetic’ (Tvedt 1994:88).  
Ethnic identities and conflict between these may well prove an important challenge for the 
SPLM/A also in post-conflict Sudan.  
Collective identities are also a way of understanding the linkage between the 
individual, his or her social belonging/boundaries and the forming of collective political 
claims. Political claims are often set forth on behalf of a collective. Collective identities 
thus can be a person’s link to the political sphere. 
Interestingly, we have seen that most identities – political, ethnic, religious – are 
defined oppositionally – in contrast or opposition to another identity. Conflicting identities 
may also reflect political conflicts, and different levels of identities may try to overcome 
these conflicts.  
Methods of Control and Authority 
For many Southern Sudanese in Uganda, the SPLM/A is an important movement to 
support as an alliance against the common enemy, ‘the Arabs’. It has been the strongest 
force from Southern Sudan in the war against the Government of Sudan (GoS). With the 
Naivasha peace negotiations, the SPLM/A has been consolidating its power within the 
South of Sudan, making the movement a political force that all Sudanese in Uganda have 
to relate to in one way or another. Either as an enemy, something one chooses to distance 
oneself from, or as a political force to support partly, though with scepticism, or as a 
political force to get deeply involved in. The strong position of the SPLM/A within the 
Sudanese exile community in Uganda is due partly to its ability to accommodate different 
identities and offer a political movement for Sudanese (especially Southerners) opposed to 
the GoS – and it is also due in part to the military force of the SPLM/A. It has achieved its 
position not only through political measures, but also through military and authoritarian 
means.  
In this section we focus on the military elements of the movement’s relation to the 
exile community, looking at methods of control, the use of force and violence, and threats 
of violence. Many Sudanese refugees in Uganda are fleeing from atrocities committed by 
the SPLM/A (Kaiser 2000), and it has been seen as a movement with authoritarian 
tendencies (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). 
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The SPLM/A is a military organization – initially primarily a guerrilla one, but in 
recent years it has had to develop more political and civilian structures, in the territories it 
has occupied and governed (Rolandsen 2005), and as a partner in the peace process. 
Although some of the SPLM/A’s political views are attractive to many Sudanese in 
Uganda, it is experienced as a military organization, and this has consequences for 
mobilization.  
How, then, have the SPLM/A’s methods of control influenced and shaped refugee 
mobilization? The use of sticks and carrots in mobilization is important. In the following 
analysis, central topics are top–down organization, military decision structures, forced 
recruitment and insecurity. 
Top–Down 
Discussing the peace process with Sudanese refugees in Uganda, I was always met with a 
lot of questions. There was obviously a great need for information about the content of the 
agreement. Many Sudanese said they wanted updates about the negotiations from their 
leaders. In Uganda, the chapter has the mandate to inform on the peace process. Basically, 
information was spread through distribution of the Nairobi-based weekly newspaper The 
Sudan Mirror, a publication highly sympathetic to the SPLM/A. Sudanese in Uganda 
acquired other information about the peace negotiations through the media (local radio or 
BBC). Very many people felt that they had not been given a say in the peace negotiations. 
Often, when meeting with people or interviewing someone, I was asked to explain the 
status of the negotiations and give my opinions and expectations about the outcome.  
One of the interviewees, Edward, presented himself as a link between the Sudanese 
community and the SPLM/A leaders. He lives in a neighbourhood in Kampala populated 
by many Sudanese. By organizing social meetings and gatherings among different groups 
in the Sudanese society, he ties to bring people together across ethnic lines. He also tries to 
recruit members to the movement. Yet he is not always very happy about the way the 
organization works: ‘I report my activities and the activity on the ground to the chapter, the 
SPLM, and to SRRA, but I get very little information back from them’, he said. Thus, he 
was disappointed about how little information he got from the leaders, though at the same 
time he was expected to report upwards. Especially he was met with demands and 
expectation among people on the ground, expecting him to provide more information on 
behalf of the movement. Edward found it difficult to mobilize support and contributions 
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for SPLM/A activities among the grassroots without being able to give anything in return. 
‘You can’t climb a tree from the top’, he said, referring to a Sudanese saying.  
The SPLM/A is organized hierarchically, with decisions coming from above. On the 
one hand, this may leave little room for the opinions of a wide range of members, but on 
the other, it might enhance the authority of the organization. 
Military Decision Structures  
John, a Sudanese student, expressed his concerns about returning to a post-conflict Sudan 
because of the militarization of SPLM/A decision structures and civil government: 
You know all the medical doctors working for the movement, they are trained as military, 
they have a rank. Because you need a rank to get responsibility. One person with no 
education, but a high military rank can have more responsibility than an educated person like 
me. This is what I fear. And they can do what they want, if you are in their way. (interview 
with John) 
Noticeably, John feels threatened by the power of the military, and this is a concern for 
him for the future. However, this quote does not say anything substantial about what will 
happen in the future, about how the SPLM/A will actually govern a post-conflict South 
Sudan. But it does indicate something about perceptions, previous experience and the 
history of how the SPLM/A is organized.  
Fears and expectations about the civil administration were an issue that came up in 
many instances when I asked refugees about return and about challenges in post-conflict 
Sudan. Another refugee, Daniel, mentioned the same problem in relation to the distribution 
of land: 
Dispute over land will be a problem. Like for example my brother, he was a refugee in 
Central Africa, and when he came back there was a soldier staying on his land. My brother 
went with his papers to the civil authorities, but they told him that those who run away can’t 
claim land. I told my brother to keep his documents and wait, because maybe, when there is 
real peace, he can get the land back. If he had insisted now, I believe they would have killed 
him. (interview with Daniel) 
Daniel was also sceptical about the militaristic traits among the SPLM/A authorities, and 
feels threatened. However, he seems more optimistic about the future – ‘when there is real 
peace’.  
The SPLM/A seek to control Sudanese refugees in Uganda. In Kampala and in the 
various refugee settlements, they have posted intelligence and security persons to keep an 
eye on activities. Their presence is known and more or less articulated: sometimes they 
will announce who they are, sometimes people just know, and at times they are 
clandestine. One key informant emphasized that it was important for the SPLM/A to have 
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representatives in the Refugee Welfare Committees: ‘The SPLA have representatives in 
most camps in the RWC, so that they have easy access to the refugees.’ (key informant) 
Many of my interviews and other reports indicate that SPLM/A representatives are 
present in most refugee camps in Uganda.31 Especially in refugee camps close to the 
border, SPLM/A activities have been strong. Many soldiers keep their wives and children 
in the camps and visit regularly. (Hovil, 2001) There have also been recruitment activities 
in the camps. One Sudanese, Joseph, told me about his stay in a refugee camp in northern 
Uganda:  
In the camp I was executive representative in the youth mobilization group for the SPLA. 
That means that I was like intelligence. I was moving around socializing with people to get to 
know what was happening. I was to report to the chairman in the camp, who again reported to 
Kampala, who again reported to Sudan. The thing is that the Arabs had three intelligence 
people present in the camp. (interview with Joseph) 
Joseph, who was recruited and worked for the SPLM/A in the camp, pointed out that 
representatives of the GoS (‘the Arabs’) also had intelligence operations in the camps. This 
suggests that also GoS was active in recruitment within the Sudanese exile community, but 
I was not able to interview anyone who was directly involved in this. And the position of 
the SPLM/A was much stronger, as previously mentioned. Joseph also wanted to join the 
SPLM/A as a soldier and receive military education. However, he did not want to go for 
training inside Sudan first, because he was afraid that they send all newcomers to the 
frontline, where they would be easy targets. 
When I was in the camp I asked them to take me to military school. They said they could take 
me to Tanzania, or Korea, but first I would have to do military training in Sudan. But my 
mother say no. In the village in Sudan the SPLA used to come to a group of people and pick 
young men, and take them by force.  
Joseph’s story points to the resource side of a militarized organization: it can bestow 
positions and authority. At the same time militarization involve risks, violence and threats, 
and this might make people shun the organization.  
Forced Recruitment 
The SPLA recruited refugees more or less forcibly from refugee camps in both Kenya and 
Uganda (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:174–5). ‘In Uganda, it was even worse. 
Settlements usually had an SPLA recruiting officer in residence, and recruitment drives 
                                                 
31 One exception might be a refugee camp in western Uganda, which has been specially designed for security 
cases: see ‘Forced Recruitment’, below. 
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were recurrent. The SPLA even wrote to individual refugees in settlements to remind them 
of their military duties.’ (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:175). 
In Adjumani district, where some of the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted, 
there had previously been incidents of coercive mass recruitment, especially in the mid- 
and late 1990s (Hovil, 2001). However, it seems that forced recruitment of large groups of 
people has now ended in the district – probably as a result of international pressure and the 
SPLM/A wanting to improve its image. All the same, small groups or individuals might 
still experience forced recruitment. 
The practice of rounding up and forcibly recruiting civilians is something that 
several of the interviewees had experienced in their home villages in Sudan as well. 
I was abducted by the SPLA as a child in 1986 and brought to Ethiopia, in a refugee camp for 
military training. When there was a regime change in Ethiopia, we were taken to Sudan. Then 
Machar split with the SPLA. I was with Machar. After the split the SPLA would kill all Nuer 
in the SPLA. (interview, primary respondent)  
This refugee, a Nuer living in Uganda, is still marked by his experiences. Even though 
Machar and Garang later re-united, he has remained suspicious about the SPLA in exile.  
Simon, a Sudanese I interviewed in Kampala, was registered in a refugee camp for 
security cases in Hoima32 in western Uganda, further from the Sudan border. Simon had 
fled the SPLA: this was something he did not mention initially, but it came up later. He 
also avoided talking about how he got to Kampala. He told me that people fleeing from the 
SPLA could not feel safe in Uganda, but that the peace talks had improved the situation at 
least temporarily: 
Many people they fled from the SPLA, and it is not always safe for people like us in Uganda, 
because Garang and Museveni they are friends. Now it is better because of the peace talks, 
but there were days when they would take people and bring them to the Sudan.  
This suggests that abductions and forced recruitment happen not only in camps close to the 
border, but also elsewhere, even in Kampala. This is supported by other studies as well 
(HRW 2002, Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005, Bernstein 2005). Some Sudanese refugees 
living in Kampala who were SPLA deserters feared reprisals from the SPLA. Therefore 
they did not register with Ugandan authorities for refugee status, fearing that the 
information would be handed over to the SPLM/A, or that they would be forced to live in 
                                                 
32 Kyangwali settlement in Hoima district was designated for ‘security cases’, like people fleeing from the SPLA, 
but Kyangwali was not completely safe, as conflicts between refugees occurred and the SPLA was even present 
(Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005:157). 
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refugee settlements in northern Uganda which ‘is not safe because of the SPLA’ (Bernstein 
2005:23). There has also been the SPLA expectation that each family will ‘donate’ one 
child to the movement, and individuals were singled out to go and fight in Sudan (Hovil 
2001:12–13). One study documented accounts of house-to-house raids for mass 
mobilization in Kampala and a mobilization raid organized in Adjumani with the 
assistance of the UPDF (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005: 176–177).  
Varying degrees of forced recruitment have characterized some of the SPLM/A’s 
mobilization activities in exile as well as in Sudan. In these instances, mobilization is 
reduced to coercion. 
Carrots 
On the other hand, the SPLM/A as a military organization is not solely an oppressive 
organization: it is also an attractive one. Being a soldier in the SPLM/A can mean gaining 
a position and a role, and in some cases may offer access to resources. As mentioned, in 
Uganda the SPLM/A (and its humanitarian branch, the SRRA) issues travel permits and 
documents to go inside Sudan. Also, in case of conflicts connected to returning, a position 
within the SPLM/A might provide advantages (as indicated in the story told by Daniel 
above, where a soldier stayed on a returnee’s land). As this Sudanese indicates, conflicts 
related to return seem likely: 
Now people are divided; there are the ones that are in exile, then there are the ones that have 
resisted in the war zones, those that stayed with the Arabs, and those that are outside, in 
Europe or America. The problem they are facing now in Kajo Keji [Sudan] is that the people 
that stayed behind are saying things like ‘you people have not taken part in the struggle, now 
you have come back to have the advantages’ (Interview, primary respondent) 
In this situation, it is possible that the SPLM/A can provide protection for return, or at least 
enhance one’s opportunities in the place of return. 
There might also be instances where refugees choose to join the SPLM/A as a way 
of coping with insecurity. For refugees who are subject to violent attacks from the LRA or 
others, joining the SPLA might be a form of self-defence. 
I wanted to go to military school, but if you go for military training in Sudan first, they send 
you to the front line. In the training we were supposed to learn driving tanks, piloting, radio 
call, and so. Other refugees they went, some of them are dead now. Especially refugees that 
were in Achol-Pii, they were attacked by the rebels and they said ‘if they come again what 
can we do? We are only refugees we have no gun’ That’s why many people they go to Sudan 
to fight. (interview, primary respondent) 
In an environment like the one experienced by Sudanese refugees in Uganda, where 
insurgency and military activities are a constant security threat, political space and actions 
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are violent. The insurgency in northern Uganda affects Sudanese refugees living in those 
areas, and, as I was told, ‘we have no arms, how can we defend ourselves?’ (interview, 
primary respondent). For some people, this insecure environment can justify joining one of 
the armed groups, for protection.  
And some, like me I came here at about 15, I had a gun when I came. They [the SPLA] gave 
me a gun when I left Palutaka to go to Uganda because the LRA was attacking us, and they 
told me ‘nobody can protect you’, so they gave me a gun. (Interview, primary respondent) 
The SPLM/A as military and violent organization functions both in favour of, and as an 
obstacle to, mobilization. Paradoxically, engaging in violence can present itself as a self-
defence strategy if one is confined to an insecure environment.  
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have focused on various factors within the Sudanese exile community 
and how they influence political mobilization. The analysis has revolved around a 
discussion of how the SPLM/A has been the most ‘successful’ organization in exile. Two 
themes have been important in this regard: collective identity and methods of control and 
authority.  
A central topic has been how the SPLM/A tries to accommodate multiple identities 
in order to include most Sudanese. Our discussion of collective identities and mobilization 
has shown that political demands are linked to collective identities. We also noted how 
collective identities have been shaped by political mobilization. Multiple identities are 
important: people can adhere to several identities, and these can become relevant in various 
situations. In addition, we have seen that identities are dynamic and flexible, rather than 
being constant, inherent and essential traits. 
The section analysing methods of control and authority has pointed to issues of force 
and power, and the role of sticks and carrots in mobilization. An interesting insight to 
emerge from this was that an insecure environment may lead to military recruitment being 
seen as an attractive measure for protection. This in turn could lead to another question: do 
sticks and carrots create different kinds of mobilization? Do the different measures create 
different types of loyalties? However, these issues are beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
Understanding the various political and social divisions within the exile community 
is important for understanding refugee mobilization. The findings presented in this chapter 
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underline that, apart from understanding the role of the international refugee regime and 
the host state, processes within the exile community itself are also important in analysing 
political mobilization among refugees. 
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6) The Dynamics of Refugee Mobilization 
We have seen how refugee mobilization among Sudanese in Uganda has been influenced 
by the role of the international refugee regime, the Ugandan host state and by processes 
within the exile community itself. Analyses in the previous chapters have shown that all 
the three factors are significant for understanding political mobilization among refugees. In 
different ways, the international refugee regime, the host state and the exile community all 
influence and shape refugee mobilization. The mobilization carried out by the SPLM/A in 
exile provides a good example of this.  
This study is meant as a complement to existing literature that describes the 
phenomenon of refugee mobilization by analysing the role of the refugee regime and the 
host state. While contributing to useful insights to the role of these factors, this literature 
has tended to underestimate the significance of social and political processes within the 
exile community itself. In describing ‘Refugee Warrior Communities’, Zolberg et al. 
(1989:275–278) depict a refugee community with a leadership structure and armed section 
that often build on structures that existed before the flight, as when an entire society has 
been displaced (as in the case of the Palestinians) or when members of the ancien regime 
constitute the hub of the community (as with the Nicaraguan Contras in Honduras). 
However, questions concerning processes and differences within the exile community have 
not been addressed, thereby tacitly implying the existence of a homogeneous refugee 
collective. Along the same lines, Lischer (2003) focuses on militarization of refugees and 
analyses various categories of refugees in order to assess their potential for militarization. 
She introduces the concept of ‘state in exile’ refugees, defined according to the origin of 
the crises. State in exile refugees are brought in exile by the leadership as a war strategy 
against the sending state; these refugees are more likely to control and divert humanitarian 
aid than other categories of refugees (Lischer 2003:92–93). She cites the example of Hutu 
refugee camps in Zaire in the aftermath of the genocide as a ‘state in exile’ refugee 
situation. The notion of a ‘state in exile’ is interesting as it might point to the social and 
political organization within the exile community, directing attention to governing 
processes between the leadership and the refugees as relevant for understanding 
mobilization. However, the analysis of Lischer’s study focuses on the role of host states 
and the international refugee regime. 
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 Studies of refugee mobilization are also linked to studies of rebel movements in 
general. One common understanding of rebel movements is to see them as instruments for 
the proxy wars of states. Prunier (2004) focuses on this, thereby reducing rebel movements 
to foreign-policy tools for governments – and this is relevant for discussions on the role of 
the host state. Adelman (1998) has argued that if refugee organizations are fighting on 
behalf of the host state, they are not refugee warriors, but actors in an interstate war. 
However, although rebel movements may receive support from other states, these states do 
not necessarily control them directly.  
Insurgent organizations must nonetheless be created on the ground, to an appreciably greater 
extent than any other form of African political organization, and it is plausible to assume that 
they must be constructed in large part from the social materials that they find there. 
Understanding insurgencies is thus to an appreciable extent a job for the political 
anthropologist. (Clapham 1998:11). 
Thus, rebel movements and political organizations need to be understood also with regard 
to their relation to the constituency, and in the case of refugee mobilization the relation to 
the exile community. The present study has shown that, in the case of the SPLM/A, both 
the dynamics within the exile community as well as the role of the host state and the exile 
community are important and significant factors for understanding refugee mobilization. 
Interaction between the Factors  
In this thesis, the three factors of the international refugee regime, the host state and the 
exile community are distinguished on the analytical level, to enable an analysis of their 
differing influences on refugee mobilization. In this section I discuss how and when the 
three factors interact and mutually reinforce (or weaken) refugee mobilization. 
Although generally focusing on the international refugee regime and host state only, 
some of the literature on refugee mobilization can provide useful illustrations of the 
interplay between these two factors. One example concerns the situation among Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan, where affiliation to specific political parties recognized by the host 
state was required in order to obtain refugee status, food and shelter in the refugee camp 
(Terry 2002:67). This gave the political parties an opportunity to mobilize members 
through their control over refugee resources, with the cooperation of the Pakistani host 
state. Thus, opportunities for refugee mobilization were enabled by the international 
refugee regime and the host state. 
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In the present study, an illustrative example of interaction among all three factors 
concerns the Dinka refugees living in Mireyi refugee camp in Adjumani. In Sudan, Dinkas 
come from the core areas for SPLM/A mobilization, and they represent the largest group in 
southern Sudan. Both UNHCR and the host state often define them as SPLM/A adherents. 
Mobilization activity has been frequent in this camp, more or less tolerated on the part of 
the host state and the international refugee regime. Moreover, many Dinka refugees were 
automatically placed in this camp, even if they were SPLM/A defectors (Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond 2005). The camp was situated close to the border and was dependent on food 
distribution. Within the exile community, Dinkas were often treated with scepticism by 
other Sudanese, especially Equatorians. This exclusion within the exile community, as well 
as structures and behaviour on the part of the host state and the international refugee 
regime, served to mutually strengthen the Dinka mobilization in the SPLM/A.  In this 
sense, the opportunity structure might have reinforced a collective identity and vice versa, 
and the interplay among the factors thereby influenced refugee mobilization. 
On the more general level, SPLM/A mobilization among Sudanese in Uganda is in 
itself an example of the interaction among the three factors. In Uganda, the SPLM/A 
mobilize within refugee camps; they are supported by the host state, and even mobilize 
Sudanese in Uganda to aid the UPDF fighting the LRA in Sudan. Thus both the 
international refugee regime and the host state influence SPLM/A mobilization, 
strengthening the SPLM/A’s position within the exile community. At the same time, 
cultural and political processes within the exile community act to influence mobilization. 
The SPLM/A sometimes uses block recruitment, where mobilization follows ethnicity. It is 
also important for the SPLM/A to handle and accommodate the various political divisions 
in order to mobilize Sudanese. Thus, SPLM/A mobilization is strengthened by the 
interaction of the three factors. 
Another aspect of interaction between the factors relates to how the factors 
contribute to the militarization of political space. This study has shown how violence has 
become a dominating element in socio-political reality and in the processes of 
mobilization, and how each factor contributes to this. The international refugee regime 
presents military solutions to refugee mobilization, and strives to present political solutions 
and secure a political space for refugees. The Ugandan host state does not allow political 
activity among refugees – apart from SPLM/A activity, where military activity and 
cooperation is frequent. Within the exile community, mobilization processes are also 
characterized by military methods and shaped by insecurity. Processes of militarization of 
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political space also make it difficult to draw a distinction between ‘military’ and ‘political’. 
Refugees are both, and in-between – victims and warriors.   
Synthesizing the Theories? 
Within social movement theories Political Opportunity Structures and Collective Identity 
theories represent two different traditions. The two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
but can provide a complementary understanding of political mobilization. A focus on 
Political Opportunity Structures directs attention towards the political institutions and 
authorities outside a given movement, whereas the Collective Identity perspective enables 
analysis of processes within the movement and the movement’s relations with its 
constituency. One way of understanding the two positions is to relate them to different 
spheres within society. In this sense, Political Opportunity Structure describes political 
mobilization in relation to an institutional sphere, while Collective Identity describes it in 
relation to a social/cultural sphere. From the analysis presented in this thesis, I would argue 
that it is necessary to grasp the processes within both of these spheres in order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of political mobilization. Polletta and Jasper (2001) present 
a similar view, but refer to the difference between the traditions as a difference in focus on 
external and internal factors that influence mobilization. In addition they relate the division 
between external and internal to a difference between formal and informal processes. 
These are relevant concepts, but for the purposes of this thesis I find the notion of an 
institutional sphere and social/cultural sphere to be more precise. 
Processes of inclusion and exclusion in the case of Sudanese refugees in Uganda 
illustrate the importance of both spheres. Processes of inclusion and exclusion proved 
important in relation to the international refugee regime and the host state, and were linked 
to settlement, livelihood and insecurity.  In a different sense, collective identity entails 
processes of exclusion and inclusion where social boundaries between people are defined 
and redefined. In the case of Sudanese, this became relevant in relation to political, ethnic 
and religious divisions. For example, a Sudanese might experience exclusion from the 
international refugee regime in being confined to a remote settlement in an insecure area, 
but at the same time be included in a community based on his/her ethnic affiliation. This 
community might in turn form the basis for resistance or mobilization against the 
authorities.  
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Processes of inclusion and exclusion are thus manifested in various forms within the 
different spheres, and the dynamics of political mobilization should encompass an analysis 
of both. In this sense, both theories of Political Opportunity Structure and Collective 
Identity can serve to shape a more complete analysis of political mobilization when seen 
together. 
The SPLM/A’s Dual Position 
One thing that has puzzled and confused me throughout this study is the dual position of 
the SPLM/A. Having studied the relationship of that organization to both the host state and 
its constituency, I realized that the SPLM/A is not only a result of mobilization processes, 
but also acts as an authority that shapes mobilization among other organizations within the 
Sudanese exile community. 
In conditions where states are weak and have neither a monopoly on violence nor 
territorial control, insurgency movements might, at least on the ground, be as significant 
authorities as states. During the time of my fieldwork, the SPLM/A controlled areas in 
Southern Sudan where it had set up governing structures, thereby representing a kind of 
state authority in parts of the South. Furthermore, the peace negotiations had brought the 
SPLM/A international recognition as a legitimate political leadership of South Sudan. The 
result of the negotiations was that in 2005 the SPLM/A formed the Government of South 
Sudan (GoSS). 
Not only the SPLM/A but other guerrilla movements in the Horn of Africa have 
assumed such state functions as civil administration and court systems; they have delivered 
humanitarian aid, had diplomatic relations abroad, and collected taxes. In all these respects, 
guerrillas have taken over tasks otherwise typical of the state (Borchgrevink 2004), which 
again indicates that we need to question the underlying assumptions about a state in this 
setting. Similarly, studies of insurgency movements need to include an analysis of how 
these movements have assumed state functions. 
The SPLM/A is challenging the authority of the state in Sudan, but in exile it has not 
been challenging Uganda as a state, nor contesting its borders. On the other hand, the 
SPLM/A has, to a certain extent, gained authority over Sudanese in Uganda. It could 
therefore be argued that the SPLM/A-governed areas extended into the refugee camps in 
Uganda. Surely this has not taken place without some degree of consent from the Ugandan 
authorities, yet it is difficult to assume that GoU can really control SPLM/A activities vis-
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à-vis the Sudanese in Uganda. An illustrative example comes from Adjumani during an 
incident of mass forced recruitment by the SPLM/A in 1999, where the UPDF seemingly 
collaborated, while the Refugee Desk Officer (also representing GoU) entered into 
negotiations with the SPLM/A and managed to secure the release of 41 of the 81 who had 
been loaded into a truck to be taken to South Sudan (Hovil 2001:11). 
This also has consequences for the international refugee regime. The anthropologist 
Wendy James (2001) points to the contradictions between how international humanitarian 
aid agencies view the refugee situation, and the actual political and military situation under 
which the refugees are living. She has studied communities on the borderland between 
Sudan and Ethiopia for decades, and documents how people living in borderlands have 
been forced to take sides due to the shifting control of the different armies and guerrillas 
(such as the SPLM/A, TPLF, EPLF, OLF, and the government armies of Sudan and 
Ethiopia) in garrison towns in the border area. James criticizes aid agencies for not being 
able to understand the political setting in which the refugees are forced to live. 
Aid workers and those who write reports directly for humanitarian agencies have to keep their 
gaze focused on the target beneficiaries alone, and the boundaries of the scheme they are 
reporting on; but from economic, political, moral and cultural points of view alike, the people 
of these schemes are tied into a wider set of relations. These relations are ultimately more 
important to the survival and welfare of most refugee populations than the assistance they get 
intermittently from the international community, whether aimed at material or (even more 
clearly) moral welfare (James 2001:31).  
She found that, in most instances, access to refugee assistance was contingent upon on one 
form of local patronage, for example the SPLM/A (James 2002:272). Her studies (2001, 
2002) reveal that refugees in borderlands may find themselves subject to different ‘state-
like’ authorities, and be forced to choose where to place their loyalties. Among the Uduk 
community that James followed for many years, people joined different rebel movements 
or government armies. In this sense, ‘[T]hey too have been not simply victims, but at 
various times victors of struggles at specific times and places; and (..) include one-time 
supporters of several different armed forces in the circles of their neighbours and kin.’ 
(James 2002:274). 
In most African states in a situation of conflict, the state’s monopoly on violence 
and control over its territory (its internal sovereignty) cannot be taken for granted. Rebel 
movements may control parts of the country, or at least render state control impossible in 
some regions. Thus, in African countries, the state as a form of governance is itself 
contested (Munro 1996:118–120). In terms of the present study, this implies that, in order 
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to understand refugee mobilization, we have to question underlying assumptions of 
concepts like ‘state’ and ‘society’ and the relationship between these.  
State Borders and Regional Dimensions of Conflict  
Studying refugee mobilization in a neighbouring country of an ongoing conflict also makes 
visible the relative impact of state borders. This relates to the foregoing point concerning 
the relation between ‘state’ and ‘society’, but more specifically calls into question the 
relationship and interplay between state borders and identities. This question might also be 
a useful point of departure for understanding regional dimensions of conflict. 
Studies of civil war and peacebuilding in Africa have often been limited to states, 
and focused on conflicts within borders. However, the government authorities in many 
African states are based in the capital and main centres, leaving border areas unstable and 
the state frontiers porous. This is often reinforced by the circumstance that many ethnic 
groups live on both sides of a border, and solidarity towards members of one’s own ethnic 
group may be stronger than towards the state, as noted by Prunier: ‘(..) a Kakwa is a 
Kakwa before being ‘Sudanese’, ‘Ugandan’ or ‘Congolese’.’  (Prunier 2004: 383).  
The borderland between Uganda and Sudan is also inhabited by similar ethnic 
groups on both sides, with a history of migration and cross-border activities. This has led 
to a transnational borderland identity, according to Merkx (2000), who also argues that 
refugee relief agencies should take these transnational identities into account (Merkx 
2000:1). Basically, he is saying that alternatives that are refugee-led and projects that are 
locally based would be more suitable for addressing the needs of refugees and migrants in 
this borderland. Merkx also notes how the international refugee regime operates with the 
state boundary as the most important marker, whereas refugees and migrants in those areas 
might not necessarily relate to the border in the same way. The transnational way that 
refugees in my study related to return is indicative of this point. While the refugees prefer 
to go back and forth assessing the situation in Sudan over a period, perhaps setting up a 
house and splitting the household, moving back and forth – a strategy which may well 
prove the most rational and secure in their situation – such an approach is very difficult to 
incorporate in return programmes set up by the international refugee regime. 
Processes related to identity boundaries can thereby challenge state boundaries. The 
interplay between state boundaries and identities is a topic which has been made visible 
and relevant in this study, and which should be further investigated. 
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State boundaries have traditionally been the starting point for scholars, with 
assumptions about a sovereign state acting as the sole legitimate wielder of force within its 
geographical frontier. In fact, this is an image that does not fit with reality. As stressed by 
Doom and Vlassenroot (1999:29), ‘None of these assumptions comes near to reality when 
dealing with Uganda and most of its neighbours. Although most of them are torn apart by 
civil wars or rebellions, often controlling only parts of the country, the regimes in place are 
simultaneously engaged in armed conflict across the border.’ This argument is also 
relevant in refugee studies, where crossing of state borders is the starting point of the 
study, but is seldom problematized or examined. When refugees are represented as victims 
only, this fails to acknowledge their history and political situation – and it is also a way of 
consolidating culture and politics within neat national geographical boundaries (Malkki 
1995). In reality, refugees challenge the ‘national order of things’, and this should be an 
articulated part of refugee studies:  
These relationships and processes occur in the context of a system of territorial national 
states. It is therefore useful to explicitly contextualize the study of refugees in this national 
order of things, instead of taking its order as a given to such an extent that it becomes 
invisible. (Malkki 1995b:516) 
How internal conflicts in neighbouring states are interlinked in practice becomes 
particularly apparent when viewed through the perspective of refugees. This is one reason 
why a study of refugee roles in conflict can contribute to a better regional understanding of 
complex conflicts. 
Concluding remarks 
The dynamics of refugee mobilization involves three factors: the international refugee 
regime, the host state and the exile community. This becomes clear both when we analyse 
the factors separately and when we study the interplay among them. The contribution of 
the present study to the field lies in its incorporation of an examination of processes within 
the exile community as well.  
Refugee mobilization is understood both through concepts of political opportunity 
structure and collective identity. Viewing these processes together has also enabled a more 
complex investigation of the phenomenon, whereby general assumptions about states and 
societies are challenged. Correctly understanding the dynamics of refugee mobilization 
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might therefore involve understandings of transnational identities, fluid state borders, state-
like guerrilla movements and regional dimensions of conflict. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has explored the phenomenon of refugee mobilization, seeking to go beyond 
the notion of refugees as either ‘victims’ or ‘warriors’. The exploration has shown refugee 
mobilization to be a complex phenomenon, and one which entails a range of challenges for 
the international refugee regime, for the host state and for the refugees themselves. The 
study has consequences for refugee protection, for understanding the role of refugees in 
conflict and conflict resolution, and thirdly for understanding the regional dimensions of 
conflict. In addition, the explorative nature of the study has contributed to a more nuanced 
understanding of refugees and of conflicts. 
The complexity between refugees as warrior and as victims reflects the difficulty in 
drawing any clear distinction between political and military mobilization on the ground. 
This might indicate that one of the challenges of the international refugee regime is to 
address the problem of militarization of refugee camps more comprehensively, by 
including political solutions as well as the proposed military solutions. If military measures 
and security forces come to dominate refugee protection management, this might mean a 
development from rights-based protection to military-based protection. The findings of this 
thesis indicate that refugee protection should include political solutions as well. 
It has been argued that humanitarian organizations should not address political 
issues, but remain neutral and impartial in order to be able to perform their primary tasks 
(see Terry 2002). Addressing the political questions and working for political solutions 
should rather be the responsibility of governments and international bodies. 
It has often been repeated that donor governments use UNHCR as a shield. By sending 
UNHCR to the crisis area, governments claim to take action while avoiding political and 
military commitments to resolve the crisis. (Lischer 2003:106) 
In this sense, the refugee protection might be said to be complex and difficult because of 
the working conditions and because of failure and lack of involvement from the rest of the 
international community. Nevertheless, it should be possible for the international refugee 
regime to improve refugee protection through a rights-based approach which would also 
include the right to (non-violent) political mobilization. 
Secondly, deeper knowledge about refugee mobilization gives further knowledge 
about the roles of refugees in conflicts and in conflict resolution. Loescher (2003) has 
called for international involvement in relation to the role of forced displacement in 
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conflict and its duration. International policy responses are required that can recognize that 
refugees are a significant reason for conflicts (Loescher 2003:31). With this, Loescher is 
pointing to the role of refugees in conflict, and arguing that this should be made relevant in 
international approaches to conflicts. However, besides focusing on refugees as cause of 
conflict, I believe it is also important to ask how refugees can serve as a resource for 
conflict resolution. Further research is needed in order to answer both of these important 
questions. 
The role of refugees in conflict and conflict resolution is an underlying topic of the 
thesis. One question to emerge from it is how refugee mobilization among Sudanese in 
Uganda will influence the implementation of the peace accord in Sudan. As explained in 
chapter five, political divisions in exile mirror political divisions within Sudan, and thereby 
some of the challenges of post-war Sudan. Furthermore, refugee mobilization may impact 
on refugee return and reintegration. Return and demobilization and reintegration 
programmes usually ignore the issue of refugee mobilization, and little is known about 
how refugee mobilization influences these processes. Also this is a topic in need of further 
investigation.  
Another question along the same line relates to the role of refugees, or the diaspora 
in general, in conflict and peacebuilding. In peace negotiations and when new governments 
are formed, persons with a base in exile often play a central role, but little research has 
been conducted on this topic. 
A third central issue to emerge from this study concerns the regional dimension of 
conflicts. A refugee focus enables us to challenge the assumption that civil wars are 
exclusively intrastate wars: they can be intertangled with conflicts involving neighbouring 
states, as in the case of Uganda and Sudan. LRA activities in Southern Sudan are now 
threatening the implementation of the peace agreement in Sudan, and have hindered 
refugee return to Sudan from Uganda, and created further displacement. Peace processes in 
Uganda are also affected by the situation in Sudan. All this indicates that the regional 
dimension should be incorporated into conflict resolution measures. 
Furthermore, this study has shown how refugees are a heterogeneous group, where 
political, social and cultural differences influence mobilization. Refugees are often treated 
as a homogeneous group both in policy-making and in research, but differences within the 
exile community should be taken into account in refugee protection measures and refugee 
research. This study of political mobilization among Sudanese refugees in Uganda has 
shown that refugees are victims and warriors, and cause and consequence, of conflict. At 
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the same time we have seen that the exile community has political resources, resources that 
might prove important for post-conflict Sudan. 
In general, the study also contributes to studies of complex crises and civil wars by 
not only examining the role of international actors and states, but also exploring 
differences and processes on the ground. The field of conflict research will gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of complex conflicts by incorporating understandings of 
social processes on the ground as well. 
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Appendix I 
Interview guide  
Thematic list; Sudanese refugees in Uganda and the peace process in Sudan 
 
The Peace Process 
What do you think of the peace accord? Do you think the outcome is a good one?  
What will the consequences be for you? 
Do you feel that refugees have had a voice in the peace process?  
How will the peace affect Sudanese refugees in Uganda? 
Do you think the same is relevant for the IDPs in Sudan? 
What do you think it will require for this to be a lasting, durable peace?  
What will be the major challenges for the rebuilding of south Sudan? 
How do you think governing the southern Sudan will be?  How will you characterize John 
Garang and the SPLM. What are earlier experiences with the government of this 
leadership? 
Do you think the south will gain strong independence from the north? As a result of the 
planned referendum? What is your opinion? why?  
 
Return 
Do think the choice of return will be a free choice? Will there be a possibility of not 
returning? Who do you think will return, and who will not? 
If you want to return, how will you proceed? When will you decide? What are your 
considerations?  
Who will you consult? 
Where will you prefer to return to? Why? 
If you don’t want to return, why? 
 
International refugee regime 
Are you a refugee? What is a refugee? When are you a refugee, situations in which you are 
a refugee, situations in which you are not a refugee 
 II 
What are the role and responsibilities of international organisation in relation to refugees? 
What are the roles of refugees in the international organisations? 
What are the rights and duties of a “refugee”?   
How would you organise if international humanitarian organisations withdraw? 
 
Host Country 
How are refugees in general treated in Uganda? National law (Alien act)?   
Can Sudanese refugees obtain Ugandan passport? 
How is the relationship between Ugandan authorities and UNHCR and its implementing 
partners? 
Describe the relationship Uganda- Sudan and Uganda -SPLM 
Can you describe your relationship with Ugandan authorities? Both local, regional state 
level 
Are there any differences between these levels? 
How is the relationship with the local community? Trading at local markets? Education? 
Do you speak the same language? Do you have ugandan friends or colleagues? 
 
Sudanese Community 
What is your position among sudanese in uganda in general? 
What other kinds of organisations would you identify with/ cooperate with? 
Do you belong to a community? Which? Why? 
What does it mean to belong to a community? 
When is community important? Examples of concrete situations? 
How is the relationship between different Sudanese communities in Uganda? 
Do you have contacts with Sudanese communities or organisations in Sudan? In Kenya? In 
other countries? 
Describe the role of SPLM in Uganda  
 
Organisation 
The history of the organisation: when was it founded, why and how has it changed 
What is the main purpose/objective for the organisation? 
Can you describe the activities of the organisation? (What you do, who, when) 
Are there any institutions you are trying to change/influence? (political  leaders, other 
organisations, international organisation) 
 III 
Are there any institutions which supports you? Morally or materially 
 
Mobilisation 
How do you recruit your members? Where? When?  
Why do you think they are recruited? 
Why do people continue to work in the organisation? 
Why do they quit? 
 
Strategy 
How do you work to reach your objective?  
How are strategy decisions made? Example? 
How do you relate to violence? ex Support but not exercise? What kind of discussions 
have you had on this issue? Describe concrete situation 
 
Personal Involvement 
How did you become involved in the organization? When? Why? 
What are your responsibilities? What is your position? 
Why did and do you get involved? 
What are your thoughts about the peace process? How is it affecting your life? 
 
 IV 
Interview Face Sheet 
Date:                      Place:                      Contact/introduced by: 
(Present myself and the project. Ensure anonymity and confidentiality. Do not feel obliged 
to answer to any questions, let me know if a question is inappropriate. Feel free to take a 
break) 
 
Name: 
Sex: 
Age: 
Residence: 
Marital status: 
Children: 
Residence of children: 
Education (subject, level, place): 
Profession/Occupation/ income generating activity: 
 
Place of birth: 
Language(s): 
Mother tongue: 
Tribe: 
 
Refugee status: 
Year of arrival in Uganda: 
Coming from where: 
Other places of refuge before Uganda: 
Most important reasons for flight 
Have you visited Sudan while in exile?  
Purpose of visit(s) ? Frequency of visits? 
Are you planning to return to Sudan? Preferred place of return? 
 V 
Appendix II 
Map: Uganda 
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Map: UNHCR in Uganda 
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Map: Sudan 
 
 
